From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mga11.intel.com (mga11.intel.com [192.55.52.93]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AC2D7CD0 for ; Mon, 26 Jun 2017 20:23:26 +0200 (CEST) Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jun 2017 11:23:26 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.39,396,1493708400"; d="scan'208";a="101655601" Received: from silpixa00399464.ir.intel.com (HELO silpixa00399464.ger.corp.intel.com) ([10.237.222.157]) by orsmga004.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 26 Jun 2017 11:23:24 -0700 From: Pablo de Lara To: declan.doherty@intel.com, zbigniew.bodek@caviumnetworks.com, jerin.jacob@caviumnetworks.com, akhil.goyal@nxp.com, hemant.agrawal@nxp.com Cc: dev@dpdk.org, Pablo de Lara Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 11:22:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20170626102300.56637-20-pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.9.4 In-Reply-To: <20170626102300.56637-1-pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com> References: <1496005522-134934-1-git-send-email-pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com> <20170626102300.56637-1-pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com> Subject: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 19/27] cryptodev: set AES-GMAC as auth-only algo X-BeenThere: dev@dpdk.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: DPDK patches and discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 18:23:28 -0000 AES-GMAC is an authentication algorithm, based on AES-GCM without encryption. To simplify its usage, now it can be used setting the authentication parameters, without requiring to concatenate a ciphering transform. Therefore, it is not required to set AAD, but authentication data length and offset, giving the user the option to have Scatter-Gather List in the input buffer, as long as the driver supports it. Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara --- app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_options_parsing.c | 3 +- app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_test_vectors.c | 5 - drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++------- drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c | 12 +- drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h | 4 +- drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c | 52 +++++-- drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd_ops.c | 9 +- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto.c | 151 ++++++++++++++------ drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto_capabilities.h | 11 +- lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h | 39 +----- test/test/test_cryptodev.c | 159 ++++++++++----------- test/test/test_cryptodev_gcm_test_vectors.h | 29 +--- 12 files changed, 374 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-) diff --git a/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_options_parsing.c b/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_options_parsing.c index 70b6a60..5c2dcff 100644 --- a/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_options_parsing.c +++ b/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_options_parsing.c @@ -820,8 +820,7 @@ cperf_options_check(struct cperf_options *options) if (options->cipher_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM || options->cipher_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CCM || options->auth_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM || - options->auth_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM || - options->auth_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) { + options->auth_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CCM) { if (options->op_type != CPERF_AEAD) { RTE_LOG(ERR, USER1, "Use --optype aead\n"); return -EINVAL; diff --git a/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_test_vectors.c b/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_test_vectors.c index b67d0f4..2e5339c 100644 --- a/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_test_vectors.c +++ b/app/test-crypto-perf/cperf_test_vectors.c @@ -456,11 +456,6 @@ cperf_test_vector_get_dummy(struct cperf_options *options) t_vec->auth_key.data = NULL; aad_alloc = 1; break; - case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC: - /* auth key should be the same as cipher key */ - t_vec->auth_key.data = cipher_key; - aad_alloc = 1; - break; default: t_vec->auth_key.data = auth_key; aad_alloc = 0; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c index cf115d3..11ab2f6 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c @@ -79,35 +79,74 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(struct aesni_gcm_session *sess, const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *auth_xform; const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *cipher_xform; uint16_t digest_length; + uint8_t key_length; + uint8_t *key; - if (xform->next == NULL || xform->next->next != NULL) { - GCM_LOG_ERR("Two and only two chained xform required"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER && - xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH) { - auth_xform = xform->next; - cipher_xform = xform; - } else if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH && - xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER) { + /* AES-GMAC */ + if (xform->next == NULL) { auth_xform = xform; - cipher_xform = xform->next; + if (auth_xform->auth.algo != RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) { + GCM_LOG_ERR("Only AES GMAC is supported as an " + "authentication only algorithm"); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Set IV parameters */ + sess->iv.offset = auth_xform->auth.iv.offset; + sess->iv.length = auth_xform->auth.iv.length; + + /* Select Crypto operation */ + if (auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) + sess->op = AESNI_GMAC_OP_GENERATE; + else + sess->op = AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY; + + key_length = auth_xform->auth.key.length; + key = auth_xform->auth.key.data; + /* AES-GCM */ } else { - GCM_LOG_ERR("Cipher and auth xform required"); - return -EINVAL; - } + if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER && + xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH) { + auth_xform = xform->next; + cipher_xform = xform; + } else if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH && + xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER) { + auth_xform = xform; + cipher_xform = xform->next; + } else { + GCM_LOG_ERR("Cipher and auth xform required " + "when using AES GCM"); + return -EINVAL; + } - if (!(cipher_xform->cipher.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM && - (auth_xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM || - auth_xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC))) { - GCM_LOG_ERR("We only support AES GCM and AES GMAC"); - return -EINVAL; - } + if (!(cipher_xform->cipher.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM && + (auth_xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM))) { + GCM_LOG_ERR("The only combined operation " + "supported is AES GCM"); + return -EINVAL; + } - /* Set IV parameters */ - sess->iv.offset = cipher_xform->cipher.iv.offset; - sess->iv.length = cipher_xform->cipher.iv.length; + /* Set IV parameters */ + sess->iv.offset = cipher_xform->cipher.iv.offset; + sess->iv.length = cipher_xform->cipher.iv.length; + + /* Select Crypto operation */ + if (cipher_xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT && + auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) + sess->op = AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION; + else if (cipher_xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT && + auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) + sess->op = AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION; + else { + GCM_LOG_ERR("Cipher/Auth operations: Encrypt/Generate or" + " Decrypt/Verify are valid only"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + key_length = cipher_xform->auth.key.length; + key = cipher_xform->auth.key.data; + + sess->aad_length = auth_xform->auth.add_auth_data_length; + } /* IV check */ if (sess->iv.length != 16 && sess->iv.length != 12 && @@ -116,39 +155,25 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(struct aesni_gcm_session *sess, return -EINVAL; } - /* Select Crypto operation */ - if (cipher_xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT && - auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) - sess->op = AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION; - else if (cipher_xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT && - auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) - sess->op = AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION; - else { - GCM_LOG_ERR("Cipher/Auth operations: Encrypt/Generate or" - " Decrypt/Verify are valid only"); - return -EINVAL; - } - digest_length = auth_xform->auth.digest_length; /* Check key length and calculate GCM pre-compute. */ - switch (cipher_xform->cipher.key.length) { + switch (key_length) { case 16: - aesni_gcm128_pre(cipher_xform->cipher.key.data, &sess->gdata); + aesni_gcm128_pre(key, &sess->gdata); sess->key = AESNI_GCM_KEY_128; break; case 32: - aesni_gcm256_pre(cipher_xform->cipher.key.data, &sess->gdata); + aesni_gcm256_pre(key, &sess->gdata); sess->key = AESNI_GCM_KEY_256; break; default: - GCM_LOG_ERR("Unsupported cipher key length"); + GCM_LOG_ERR("Unsupported cipher/auth key length"); return -EINVAL; } - sess->aad_length = auth_xform->auth.add_auth_data_length; /* Digest check */ if (digest_length != 16 && digest_length != 12 && @@ -211,9 +236,20 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *iv_ptr; struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op = op->sym; struct rte_mbuf *m_src = sym_op->m_src; - uint32_t offset = sym_op->cipher.data.offset; + uint32_t offset, data_offset, data_length; uint32_t part_len, total_len, data_len; + if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION || + session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) { + offset = sym_op->cipher.data.offset; + data_offset = offset; + data_length = sym_op->cipher.data.length; + } else { + offset = sym_op->auth.data.offset; + data_offset = offset; + data_length = sym_op->auth.data.length; + } + RTE_ASSERT(m_src != NULL); while (offset >= m_src->data_len) { @@ -224,12 +260,12 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, } data_len = m_src->data_len - offset; - part_len = (data_len < sym_op->cipher.data.length) ? data_len : - sym_op->cipher.data.length; + part_len = (data_len < data_length) ? data_len : + data_length; /* Destination buffer is required when segmented source buffer */ - RTE_ASSERT((part_len == sym_op->cipher.data.length) || - ((part_len != sym_op->cipher.data.length) && + RTE_ASSERT((part_len == data_length) || + ((part_len != data_length) && (sym_op->m_dst != NULL))); /* Segmented destination buffer is not supported */ RTE_ASSERT((sym_op->m_dst == NULL) || @@ -239,9 +275,9 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, dst = sym_op->m_dst ? rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(sym_op->m_dst, uint8_t *, - sym_op->cipher.data.offset) : + data_offset) : rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(sym_op->m_src, uint8_t *, - sym_op->cipher.data.offset); + data_offset); src = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src, uint8_t *, offset); @@ -265,7 +301,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].update(&session->gdata, dst, src, (uint64_t)part_len); - total_len = sym_op->cipher.data.length - part_len; + total_len = data_length - part_len; while (total_len) { dst += part_len; @@ -286,7 +322,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata, sym_op->auth.digest.data, (uint64_t)session->digest_length); - } else { /* session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION */ + } else if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) { uint8_t *auth_tag = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(sym_op->m_dst ? sym_op->m_dst : sym_op->m_src, session->digest_length); @@ -303,7 +339,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].update(&session->gdata, dst, src, (uint64_t)part_len); - total_len = sym_op->cipher.data.length - part_len; + total_len = data_length - part_len; while (total_len) { dst += part_len; @@ -324,6 +360,32 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op, aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata, auth_tag, (uint64_t)session->digest_length); + } else if (session->op == AESNI_GMAC_OP_GENERATE) { + aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].init(&session->gdata, + iv_ptr, + src, + (uint64_t)data_length); + aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata, + sym_op->auth.digest.data, + (uint64_t)session->digest_length); + } else { /* AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY */ + uint8_t *auth_tag = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(sym_op->m_dst ? + sym_op->m_dst : sym_op->m_src, + session->digest_length); + + if (!auth_tag) { + GCM_LOG_ERR("auth_tag"); + return -1; + } + + aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].init(&session->gdata, + iv_ptr, + src, + (uint64_t)data_length); + + aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata, + auth_tag, + (uint64_t)session->digest_length); } return 0; @@ -350,7 +412,8 @@ post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op) op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS; /* Verify digest if required */ - if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) { + if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION || + session->op == AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY) { uint8_t *tag = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m, uint8_t *, m->data_len - session->digest_length); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c index 542e6c4..39285d0 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c @@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_gcm_pmd_capabilities[] = { .max = 16, .increment = 4 }, - .aad_size = { - .min = 0, - .max = 65535, - .increment = 1 - }, - .iv_size = { 0 } + .aad_size = { 0 }, + .iv_size = { + .min = 12, + .max = 12, + .increment = 0 + } }, } }, } }, diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h index 05fabe6..9dea80d 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h @@ -80,7 +80,9 @@ struct aesni_gcm_qp { enum aesni_gcm_operation { AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION, - AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION + AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION, + AESNI_GMAC_OP_GENERATE, + AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY }; enum aesni_gcm_key { diff --git a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c index 7b39691..32062a0 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c @@ -330,13 +330,41 @@ openssl_set_session_auth_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess, /* Select auth algo */ switch (xform->auth.algo) { - case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC: case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM: - /* Check additional condition for AES_GMAC/GCM */ + /* Check additional condition for AES_GCM */ if (sess->cipher.algo != RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM) return -EINVAL; sess->chain_order = OPENSSL_CHAIN_COMBINED; break; + case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC: + sess->chain_order = OPENSSL_CHAIN_COMBINED; + + /* Set IV parameters */ + sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset; + sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length; + + /* + * OpenSSL requires GMAC to be a GCM operation + * with no cipher data length + */ + sess->cipher.mode = OPENSSL_CIPHER_LIB; + if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) + sess->cipher.direction = RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT; + else + sess->cipher.direction = RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT; + + sess->cipher.key.length = xform->auth.key.length; + sess->cipher.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + + if (get_cipher_algo(RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM, + sess->cipher.key.length, + &sess->cipher.evp_algo) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + get_cipher_key(xform->auth.key.data, xform->auth.key.length, + sess->cipher.key.data); + + break; case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5: case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA1: @@ -923,6 +951,7 @@ process_openssl_combined_op /* cipher */ uint8_t *dst = NULL, *iv, *tag, *aad; int srclen, ivlen, aadlen, status = -1; + uint32_t offset; /* * Segmented destination buffer is not supported for @@ -936,32 +965,37 @@ process_openssl_combined_op iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *, sess->iv.offset); ivlen = sess->iv.length; - aad = op->sym->auth.aad.data; - aadlen = sess->auth.aad_length; - tag = op->sym->auth.digest.data; if (tag == NULL) tag = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mbuf_dst, uint8_t *, op->sym->cipher.data.offset + op->sym->cipher.data.length); - if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) + if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) { srclen = 0; - else { + offset = op->sym->auth.data.offset; + aadlen = op->sym->auth.data.length; + aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mbuf_src, uint8_t *, + op->sym->auth.data.offset); + + } else { srclen = op->sym->cipher.data.length; dst = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mbuf_dst, uint8_t *, op->sym->cipher.data.offset); + offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset; + aad = op->sym->auth.aad.data; + aadlen = sess->auth.aad_length; } if (sess->cipher.direction == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT) status = process_openssl_auth_encryption_gcm( - mbuf_src, op->sym->cipher.data.offset, srclen, + mbuf_src, offset, srclen, aad, aadlen, iv, ivlen, sess->cipher.key.data, dst, tag, sess->cipher.ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo); else status = process_openssl_auth_decryption_gcm( - mbuf_src, op->sym->cipher.data.offset, srclen, + mbuf_src, offset, srclen, aad, aadlen, iv, ivlen, sess->cipher.key.data, dst, tag, sess->cipher.ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd_ops.c index 3026dbd..fc525d9 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd_ops.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd_ops.c @@ -407,12 +407,11 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities openssl_pmd_capabilities[] = { .max = 16, .increment = 0 }, - .aad_size = { - .min = 8, - .max = 65532, + .iv_size = { + .min = 12, + .max = 16, .increment = 4 - }, - .iv_size = { 0 } + } }, } }, } }, diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto.c index 6174f61..dfd778c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto.c @@ -518,6 +518,8 @@ qat_crypto_sym_configure_session_auth(struct rte_cryptodev *dev, struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform *cipher_xform = NULL; struct qat_pmd_private *internals = dev->data->dev_private; auth_xform = qat_get_auth_xform(xform); + uint8_t *key_data = auth_xform->key.data; + uint8_t key_length = auth_xform->key.length; switch (auth_xform->algo) { case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA1_HMAC: @@ -539,10 +541,22 @@ qat_crypto_sym_configure_session_auth(struct rte_cryptodev *dev, session->qat_hash_alg = ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_AES_XCBC_MAC; break; case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM: + cipher_xform = qat_get_cipher_xform(xform); + session->qat_hash_alg = ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_128; + + key_data = cipher_xform->key.data; + key_length = cipher_xform->key.length; break; case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC: + if (qat_alg_validate_aes_key(auth_xform->key.length, + &session->qat_cipher_alg) != 0) { + PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Invalid AES key size"); + goto error_out; + } + session->qat_mode = ICP_QAT_HW_CIPHER_CTR_MODE; session->qat_hash_alg = ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_128; + break; case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2: session->qat_hash_alg = ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_SNOW_3G_UIA2; @@ -582,30 +596,62 @@ qat_crypto_sym_configure_session_auth(struct rte_cryptodev *dev, auth_xform->algo); goto error_out; } - cipher_xform = qat_get_cipher_xform(xform); session->auth_iv.offset = auth_xform->iv.offset; session->auth_iv.length = auth_xform->iv.length; - if ((session->qat_hash_alg == ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_128) || - (session->qat_hash_alg == - ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_64)) { - if (qat_alg_aead_session_create_content_desc_auth(session, - cipher_xform->key.data, - cipher_xform->key.length, - auth_xform->add_auth_data_length, - auth_xform->digest_length, - auth_xform->op)) - goto error_out; + if (auth_xform->algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) { + if (auth_xform->op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) { + session->qat_cmd = ICP_QAT_FW_LA_CMD_CIPHER_HASH; + session->qat_dir = ICP_QAT_HW_CIPHER_ENCRYPT; + /* + * It needs to create cipher desc content first, + * then authentication + */ + if (qat_alg_aead_session_create_content_desc_cipher(session, + auth_xform->key.data, + auth_xform->key.length)) + goto error_out; + + if (qat_alg_aead_session_create_content_desc_auth(session, + key_data, + key_length, + 0, + auth_xform->digest_length, + auth_xform->op)) + goto error_out; + } else { + session->qat_cmd = ICP_QAT_FW_LA_CMD_HASH_CIPHER; + session->qat_dir = ICP_QAT_HW_CIPHER_DECRYPT; + /* + * It needs to create authentication desc content first, + * then cipher + */ + if (qat_alg_aead_session_create_content_desc_auth(session, + key_data, + key_length, + 0, + auth_xform->digest_length, + auth_xform->op)) + goto error_out; + + if (qat_alg_aead_session_create_content_desc_cipher(session, + auth_xform->key.data, + auth_xform->key.length)) + goto error_out; + } + /* Restore to authentication only only */ + session->qat_cmd = ICP_QAT_FW_LA_CMD_AUTH; } else { if (qat_alg_aead_session_create_content_desc_auth(session, - auth_xform->key.data, - auth_xform->key.length, + key_data, + key_length, auth_xform->add_auth_data_length, auth_xform->digest_length, auth_xform->op)) goto error_out; } + session->digest_length = auth_xform->digest_length; return session; @@ -897,6 +943,28 @@ qat_sgl_fill_array(struct rte_mbuf *buf, uint64_t buff_start, return 0; } +static inline void +set_cipher_iv(uint16_t iv_length, uint16_t iv_offset, + struct icp_qat_fw_la_cipher_req_params *cipher_param, + struct rte_crypto_op *op, + struct icp_qat_fw_la_bulk_req *qat_req) +{ + /* copy IV into request if it fits */ + if (iv_length <= sizeof(cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array)) { + rte_memcpy(cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array, + rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *, + iv_offset), + iv_length); + } else { + ICP_QAT_FW_LA_CIPH_IV_FLD_FLAG_SET( + qat_req->comn_hdr.serv_specif_flags, + ICP_QAT_FW_CIPH_IV_64BIT_PTR); + cipher_param->u.s.cipher_IV_ptr = + rte_crypto_op_ctophys_offset(op, + iv_offset); + } +} + static inline int qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, struct qat_crypto_op_cookie *qat_op_cookie) @@ -912,7 +980,6 @@ qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, uint32_t min_ofs = 0; uint64_t src_buf_start = 0, dst_buf_start = 0; uint8_t do_sgl = 0; - uint8_t *cipher_iv_ptr = NULL; #ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_QAT_DEBUG_TX if (unlikely(op->type != RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC)) { @@ -985,22 +1052,8 @@ qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, cipher_ofs = op->sym->cipher.data.offset; } - cipher_iv_ptr = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *, - ctx->cipher_iv.offset); - /* copy IV into request if it fits */ - if (ctx->cipher_iv.length <= - sizeof(cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array)) { - rte_memcpy(cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array, - cipher_iv_ptr, - ctx->cipher_iv.length); - } else { - ICP_QAT_FW_LA_CIPH_IV_FLD_FLAG_SET( - qat_req->comn_hdr.serv_specif_flags, - ICP_QAT_FW_CIPH_IV_64BIT_PTR); - cipher_param->u.s.cipher_IV_ptr = - rte_crypto_op_ctophys_offset(op, - ctx->cipher_iv.offset); - } + set_cipher_iv(ctx->cipher_iv.length, ctx->cipher_iv.offset, + cipher_param, op, qat_req); min_ofs = cipher_ofs; } @@ -1050,10 +1103,18 @@ qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_128 || ctx->qat_hash_alg == ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_64) { - auth_ofs = op->sym->cipher.data.offset; - auth_len = op->sym->cipher.data.length; - - auth_param->u1.aad_adr = op->sym->auth.aad.phys_addr; + /* AES-GCM */ + if (do_cipher) { + auth_ofs = op->sym->cipher.data.offset; + auth_len = op->sym->cipher.data.length; + + auth_param->u1.aad_adr = op->sym->auth.aad.phys_addr; + /* AES-GMAC */ + } else { + set_cipher_iv(ctx->auth_iv.length, + ctx->auth_iv.offset, + cipher_param, op, qat_req); + } } else { auth_ofs = op->sym->auth.data.offset; auth_len = op->sym->auth.data.length; @@ -1169,7 +1230,8 @@ qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, if (ctx->qat_hash_alg == ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_128 || ctx->qat_hash_alg == ICP_QAT_HW_AUTH_ALGO_GALOIS_64) { - if (ctx->cipher_iv.length == 12) { + if (ctx->cipher_iv.length == 12 || + ctx->auth_iv.length == 12) { /* * For GCM a 12 bit IV is allowed, * but we need to inform the f/w @@ -1178,20 +1240,13 @@ qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, qat_req->comn_hdr.serv_specif_flags, ICP_QAT_FW_LA_GCM_IV_LEN_12_OCTETS); } - if (op->sym->cipher.data.length == 0) { - /* - * GMAC - */ - qat_req->comn_mid.dest_data_addr = - qat_req->comn_mid.src_data_addr = - op->sym->auth.aad.phys_addr; + /* GMAC */ + if (!do_cipher) { qat_req->comn_mid.dst_length = qat_req->comn_mid.src_length = rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src); - cipher_param->cipher_length = 0; - cipher_param->cipher_offset = 0; auth_param->u1.aad_adr = 0; - auth_param->auth_len = ctx->aad_len; + auth_param->auth_len = op->sym->auth.data.length; auth_param->auth_off = op->sym->auth.data.offset; auth_param->u2.aad_sz = 0; } @@ -1203,9 +1258,13 @@ qat_write_hw_desc_entry(struct rte_crypto_op *op, uint8_t *out_msg, rte_hexdump(stdout, "src_data:", rte_pktmbuf_mtod(op->sym->m_src, uint8_t*), rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src)); - if (do_cipher) + if (do_cipher) { + uint8_t *cipher_iv_ptr = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, + uint8_t *, + ctx->cipher_iv.offset); rte_hexdump(stdout, "cipher iv:", cipher_iv_ptr, ctx->cipher_iv.length); + } if (do_auth) { if (ctx->auth_iv.length) { diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto_capabilities.h b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto_capabilities.h index fbff148..d863ccd 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto_capabilities.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_crypto_capabilities.h @@ -232,12 +232,11 @@ .max = 16, \ .increment = 4 \ }, \ - .aad_size = { \ - .min = 1, \ - .max = 65535, \ - .increment = 1 \ - }, \ - .iv_size = { 0 } \ + .iv_size = { \ + .min = 12, \ + .max = 12, \ + .increment = 0 \ + } \ }, } \ }, } \ }, \ diff --git a/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h b/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h index de4031a..f174e12 100644 --- a/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h +++ b/lib/librte_cryptodev/rte_crypto_sym.h @@ -84,11 +84,10 @@ enum rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm { /**< AES algorithm in F8 mode */ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM, /**< AES algorithm in GCM mode. When this cipher algorithm is used the - * *RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM* or *RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC* element - * of the *rte_crypto_auth_algorithm* enum MUST be used to set up - * the related *rte_crypto_auth_setup_data* structure in the session - * context or in the op_params of the crypto operation structure - * in the case of a session-less crypto operation. + * *RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM* element of the *rte_crypto_auth_algorithm* + * enum MUST be used to set up the related *rte_crypto_auth_setup_data* + * structure in the session context or in the op_params of the crypto + * operation structure in the case of a session-less crypto operation. */ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_XTS, /**< AES algorithm in XTS mode */ @@ -268,13 +267,7 @@ enum rte_crypto_auth_algorithm { * op_params parameter MUST be set for a session-less crypto operation. */ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC, - /**< AES GMAC algorithm. When this hash algorithm - * is used, the RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM element of the - * rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm enum MUST be used to set up the related - * rte_crypto_cipher_setup_data structure in the session context, or - * the corresponding parameter in the crypto operation data structures - * op_params parameter MUST be set for a session-less crypto operation. - */ + /**< AES GMAC algorithm. */ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC, /**< AES XCBC algorithm. */ @@ -384,11 +377,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_auth_xform { * block B0 and the encoded length. The maximum permitted value in * this case is 222 bytes. * - * @note - * For AES-GMAC (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) mode of operation - * this field is not used and should be set to 0. Instead the length - * of the AAD data is specified in additional authentication data - * length field of the rte_crypto_sym_op_data structure */ struct { @@ -522,10 +510,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * values. * * @note - * For AES-GMAC @ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC, this - * field should be set to 0. - * - * @note * For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UEA2, * KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8 * and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3, @@ -547,11 +531,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * ignored. The field @ref aad field * should be set instead. * - * @note For AES-GMAC (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) - * mode of operation, this field is set to 0. aad data - * pointer of rte_crypto_sym_op_data structure is - * used instead - * * @note * For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2, * KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9 @@ -569,11 +548,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * instead. * * @note - * For AES-GMAC @ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC mode - * of operation, this field is set to 0. - * Auth.aad.length is used instead. - * - * @note * For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2, * KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9 * and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3, @@ -644,9 +618,6 @@ struct rte_crypto_sym_op { * any space to round this up to the nearest multiple * of the block size (16 bytes). * - * @note - * For AES-GMAC (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) mode of - * operation, this field is used to pass plaintext. */ phys_addr_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */ } aad; diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c index a1243d0..11031a0 100644 --- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c +++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c @@ -6282,17 +6282,7 @@ create_gmac_operation(enum rte_crypto_auth_operation op, struct crypto_unittest_params *ut_params = &unittest_params; struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op; - unsigned aad_pad_len; - - aad_pad_len = RTE_ALIGN_CEIL(tdata->aad.len, 16); - - /* - * Runtime generate the large plain text instead of use hard code - * plain text vector. It is done to avoid create huge source file - * with the test vector. - */ - if (tdata->aad.len == GMAC_LARGE_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH) - generate_gmac_large_plaintext(tdata->aad.data); + uint32_t plaintext_pad_len = RTE_ALIGN_CEIL(tdata->plaintext.len, 16); /* Generate Crypto op data structure */ ut_params->op = rte_crypto_op_alloc(ts_params->op_mpool, @@ -6301,14 +6291,6 @@ create_gmac_operation(enum rte_crypto_auth_operation op, "Failed to allocate symmetric crypto operation struct"); sym_op = ut_params->op->sym; - sym_op->auth.aad.data = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(ut_params->ibuf, - aad_pad_len); - TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(sym_op->auth.aad.data, - "no room to append aad"); - - sym_op->auth.aad.phys_addr = - rte_pktmbuf_mtophys(ut_params->ibuf); - memcpy(sym_op->auth.aad.data, tdata->aad.data, tdata->aad.len); sym_op->auth.digest.data = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append( ut_params->ibuf, tdata->gmac_tag.len); @@ -6316,7 +6298,7 @@ create_gmac_operation(enum rte_crypto_auth_operation op, "no room to append digest"); sym_op->auth.digest.phys_addr = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys_offset( - ut_params->ibuf, aad_pad_len); + ut_params->ibuf, plaintext_pad_len); if (op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) { rte_memcpy(sym_op->auth.digest.data, tdata->gmac_tag.data, @@ -6337,31 +6319,20 @@ create_gmac_operation(enum rte_crypto_auth_operation op, sym_op->cipher.data.offset = 0; sym_op->auth.data.offset = 0; - sym_op->auth.data.length = 0; + sym_op->auth.data.length = tdata->plaintext.len; return 0; } static int create_gmac_session(uint8_t dev_id, - enum rte_crypto_cipher_operation op, const struct gmac_test_data *tdata, enum rte_crypto_auth_operation auth_op) { - uint8_t cipher_key[tdata->key.len]; + uint8_t auth_key[tdata->key.len]; struct crypto_unittest_params *ut_params = &unittest_params; - memcpy(cipher_key, tdata->key.data, tdata->key.len); - - /* For GMAC we setup cipher parameters */ - ut_params->cipher_xform.type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER; - ut_params->cipher_xform.next = NULL; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.op = op; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.key.data = cipher_key; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.key.length = tdata->key.len; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.iv.offset = IV_OFFSET; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.iv.length = tdata->iv.len; + memcpy(auth_key, tdata->key.data, tdata->key.len); ut_params->auth_xform.type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH; ut_params->auth_xform.next = NULL; @@ -6369,14 +6340,15 @@ static int create_gmac_session(uint8_t dev_id, ut_params->auth_xform.auth.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.op = auth_op; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.digest_length = tdata->gmac_tag.len; - ut_params->auth_xform.auth.add_auth_data_length = tdata->aad.len; - ut_params->auth_xform.auth.key.length = 0; - ut_params->auth_xform.auth.key.data = NULL; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.add_auth_data_length = 0; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.key.length = tdata->key.len; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.key.data = auth_key; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.iv.offset = IV_OFFSET; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.iv.length = tdata->iv.len; - ut_params->cipher_xform.next = &ut_params->auth_xform; ut_params->sess = rte_cryptodev_sym_session_create(dev_id, - &ut_params->cipher_xform); + &ut_params->auth_xform); TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(ut_params->sess, "Session creation failed"); @@ -6391,20 +6363,19 @@ test_AES_GMAC_authentication(const struct gmac_test_data *tdata) int retval; - uint8_t *auth_tag, *p; - uint16_t aad_pad_len; + uint8_t *auth_tag, *plaintext; + uint16_t plaintext_pad_len; TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(tdata->gmac_tag.len, 0, "No GMAC length in the source data"); retval = create_gmac_session(ts_params->valid_devs[0], - RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT, tdata, RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE); if (retval < 0) return retval; - if (tdata->aad.len > MBUF_SIZE) + if (tdata->plaintext.len > MBUF_SIZE) ut_params->ibuf = rte_pktmbuf_alloc(ts_params->large_mbuf_pool); else ut_params->ibuf = rte_pktmbuf_alloc(ts_params->mbuf_pool); @@ -6414,9 +6385,22 @@ test_AES_GMAC_authentication(const struct gmac_test_data *tdata) memset(rte_pktmbuf_mtod(ut_params->ibuf, uint8_t *), 0, rte_pktmbuf_tailroom(ut_params->ibuf)); - aad_pad_len = RTE_ALIGN_CEIL(tdata->aad.len, 16); + plaintext_pad_len = RTE_ALIGN_CEIL(tdata->plaintext.len, 16); + /* + * Runtime generate the large plain text instead of use hard code + * plain text vector. It is done to avoid create huge source file + * with the test vector. + */ + if (tdata->plaintext.len == GMAC_LARGE_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH) + generate_gmac_large_plaintext(tdata->plaintext.data); + + plaintext = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(ut_params->ibuf, + plaintext_pad_len); + TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(plaintext, "no room to append plaintext"); - p = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(ut_params->ibuf, uint8_t *); + memcpy(plaintext, tdata->plaintext.data, tdata->plaintext.len); + TEST_HEXDUMP(stdout, "plaintext:", plaintext, + tdata->plaintext.len); retval = create_gmac_operation(RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE, tdata); @@ -6436,9 +6420,9 @@ test_AES_GMAC_authentication(const struct gmac_test_data *tdata) if (ut_params->op->sym->m_dst) { auth_tag = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(ut_params->op->sym->m_dst, - uint8_t *, aad_pad_len); + uint8_t *, plaintext_pad_len); } else { - auth_tag = p + aad_pad_len; + auth_tag = plaintext + plaintext_pad_len; } TEST_HEXDUMP(stdout, "auth tag:", auth_tag, tdata->gmac_tag.len); @@ -6482,18 +6466,19 @@ test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify(const struct gmac_test_data *tdata) struct crypto_testsuite_params *ts_params = &testsuite_params; struct crypto_unittest_params *ut_params = &unittest_params; int retval; + uint32_t plaintext_pad_len; + uint8_t *plaintext; TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL(tdata->gmac_tag.len, 0, "No GMAC length in the source data"); retval = create_gmac_session(ts_params->valid_devs[0], - RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT, tdata, RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY); if (retval < 0) return retval; - if (tdata->aad.len > MBUF_SIZE) + if (tdata->plaintext.len > MBUF_SIZE) ut_params->ibuf = rte_pktmbuf_alloc(ts_params->large_mbuf_pool); else ut_params->ibuf = rte_pktmbuf_alloc(ts_params->mbuf_pool); @@ -6503,6 +6488,24 @@ test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify(const struct gmac_test_data *tdata) memset(rte_pktmbuf_mtod(ut_params->ibuf, uint8_t *), 0, rte_pktmbuf_tailroom(ut_params->ibuf)); + plaintext_pad_len = RTE_ALIGN_CEIL(tdata->plaintext.len, 16); + + /* + * Runtime generate the large plain text instead of use hard code + * plain text vector. It is done to avoid create huge source file + * with the test vector. + */ + if (tdata->plaintext.len == GMAC_LARGE_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH) + generate_gmac_large_plaintext(tdata->plaintext.data); + + plaintext = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(ut_params->ibuf, + plaintext_pad_len); + TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(plaintext, "no room to append plaintext"); + + memcpy(plaintext, tdata->plaintext.data, tdata->plaintext.len); + TEST_HEXDUMP(stdout, "plaintext:", plaintext, + tdata->plaintext.len); + retval = create_gmac_operation(RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY, tdata); @@ -6616,8 +6619,7 @@ hmac_sha1_test_crypto_vector = { static const struct test_crypto_vector aes128_gmac_test_vector = { .auth_algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC, - .crypto_algo = RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM, - .aad = { + .plaintext = { .data = plaintext_hash, .len = 512 }, @@ -6628,7 +6630,7 @@ aes128_gmac_test_vector = { }, .len = 12 }, - .cipher_key = { + .auth_key = { .data = { 0x42, 0x1A, 0x7D, 0x3D, 0xF5, 0x82, 0x80, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0x35, 0x5C, 0x3B, 0xDD, 0x9A, 0x65, 0xBA @@ -6746,22 +6748,28 @@ create_auth_cipher_session(struct crypto_unittest_params *ut_params, /* Setup Authentication Parameters */ ut_params->auth_xform.type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.op = auth_op; - ut_params->auth_xform.next = &ut_params->cipher_xform; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.algo = reference->auth_algo; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.key.length = reference->auth_key.len; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.key.data = auth_key; ut_params->auth_xform.auth.digest_length = reference->digest.len; - ut_params->auth_xform.auth.add_auth_data_length = reference->aad.len; - /* Setup Cipher Parameters */ - ut_params->cipher_xform.type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER; - ut_params->cipher_xform.next = NULL; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.algo = reference->crypto_algo; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.op = cipher_op; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.key.data = cipher_key; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.key.length = reference->cipher_key.len; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.iv.offset = IV_OFFSET; - ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.iv.length = reference->iv.len; + if (reference->auth_algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) { + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.iv.offset = IV_OFFSET; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.iv.length = reference->iv.len; + } else { + ut_params->auth_xform.next = &ut_params->cipher_xform; + ut_params->auth_xform.auth.add_auth_data_length = reference->aad.len; + + /* Setup Cipher Parameters */ + ut_params->cipher_xform.type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER; + ut_params->cipher_xform.next = NULL; + ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.algo = reference->crypto_algo; + ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.op = cipher_op; + ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.key.data = cipher_key; + ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.key.length = reference->cipher_key.len; + ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.iv.offset = IV_OFFSET; + ut_params->cipher_xform.cipher.iv.length = reference->iv.len; + } /* Create Crypto session*/ ut_params->sess = rte_cryptodev_sym_session_create(dev_id, @@ -6839,16 +6847,6 @@ create_auth_GMAC_operation(struct crypto_testsuite_params *ts_params, /* set crypto operation source mbuf */ sym_op->m_src = ut_params->ibuf; - /* aad */ - sym_op->auth.aad.data = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(ut_params->ibuf, - reference->aad.len); - TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(sym_op->auth.aad.data, "no room to append AAD"); - memcpy(sym_op->auth.aad.data, reference->aad.data, reference->aad.len); - - TEST_HEXDUMP(stdout, "AAD:", sym_op->auth.aad.data, reference->aad.len); - - sym_op->auth.aad.phys_addr = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys(ut_params->ibuf); - /* digest */ sym_op->auth.digest.data = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append( ut_params->ibuf, reference->digest.len); @@ -6876,7 +6874,7 @@ create_auth_GMAC_operation(struct crypto_testsuite_params *ts_params, sym_op->cipher.data.length = 0; sym_op->cipher.data.offset = 0; - sym_op->auth.data.length = 0; + sym_op->auth.data.length = reference->plaintext.len; sym_op->auth.data.offset = 0; return 0; @@ -7026,6 +7024,7 @@ test_authentication_verify_GMAC_fail_when_corruption( unsigned int data_corrupted) { int retval; + uint8_t *plaintext; /* Create session */ retval = create_auth_cipher_session(ut_params, @@ -7044,6 +7043,13 @@ test_authentication_verify_GMAC_fail_when_corruption( memset(rte_pktmbuf_mtod(ut_params->ibuf, uint8_t *), 0, rte_pktmbuf_tailroom(ut_params->ibuf)); + plaintext = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(ut_params->ibuf, + reference->plaintext.len); + TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(plaintext, "no room to append plaintext"); + memcpy(plaintext, reference->plaintext.data, reference->plaintext.len); + + TEST_HEXDUMP(stdout, "plaintext:", plaintext, reference->plaintext.len); + /* Create operation */ retval = create_auth_verify_GMAC_operation(ts_params, ut_params, @@ -7053,10 +7059,9 @@ test_authentication_verify_GMAC_fail_when_corruption( return retval; if (data_corrupted) - data_corruption(ut_params->op->sym->auth.aad.data); + data_corruption(plaintext); else - tag_corruption(ut_params->op->sym->auth.aad.data, - reference->aad.len); + tag_corruption(plaintext, reference->aad.len); ut_params->op = process_crypto_request(ts_params->valid_devs[0], ut_params->op); diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev_gcm_test_vectors.h b/test/test/test_cryptodev_gcm_test_vectors.h index 5764edb..ac4b0d4 100644 --- a/test/test/test_cryptodev_gcm_test_vectors.h +++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev_gcm_test_vectors.h @@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ struct gmac_test_data { struct { uint8_t *data; unsigned len; - } aad; - - struct { - uint8_t *data; - unsigned len; } plaintext; struct { @@ -1484,14 +1479,10 @@ static const struct gmac_test_data gmac_test_case_1 = { 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }, .len = 12 }, - .aad = { + .plaintext = { .data = gmac_plaintext, .len = 160 }, - .plaintext = { - .data = NULL, - .len = 0 - }, .gmac_tag = { .data = { 0x4C, 0x0C, 0x4F, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0xD8, @@ -1516,14 +1507,10 @@ static const struct gmac_test_data gmac_test_case_2 = { 0x55, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x15, }, .len = 12 }, - .aad = { + .plaintext = { .data = gmac_plaintext, .len = 80 }, - .plaintext = { - .data = NULL, - .len = 0 - }, .gmac_tag = { .data = { 0xCF, 0x82, 0x80, 0x64, 0x02, 0x46, 0xF4, 0xFB, @@ -1550,14 +1537,10 @@ static const struct gmac_test_data gmac_test_case_3 = { }, .len = 12 }, - .aad = { + .plaintext = { .data = gmac_plaintext, .len = 65 }, - .plaintext = { - .data = NULL, - .len = 0 - }, .gmac_tag = { .data = { 0x77, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xB1, 0x87, 0xDB, 0xA9, @@ -2214,14 +2197,10 @@ static const struct gmac_test_data gmac_test_case_4 = { }, .len = 12 }, - .aad = { + .plaintext = { .data = gmac_plaintext, .len = GMAC_LARGE_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH }, - .plaintext = { - .data = NULL, - .len = 0 - }, .gmac_tag = { .data = { 0x3f, 0x07, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xea, 0xc2, -- 2.9.4