Re: [dpdk-dev] Question on mlx5 PMD txq memory registration

[Bruce Richardson <bruce.richardson@intel.com>]

On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 12:03:41PM +0300, Sagi Grimberg wrote:
> 
> > > I don't understand the security argument. Its completely private to the
> > > driver. anything under librte is equivalent to an OS wrt networking, so I fail to
> > > see what is the security feature your talking about.
> > 
> > You are correct that as a root you are able to do whatever you want on the server.
> > The security I refer to is to protect against badly written code.
> > 
> > The fact the PMD only registers the mempools, and use the device engine to translate the VA, provide some protection.
> > For example, one DPDK process will not be able to access the memory of other DPDK process *by mistake*.
> 
> Well, this is a fair argument, but without a *complete* solution for all
> of dpdk peripherals, it has very little merit (if at all). A badly
> written code can just as easily crash a server by passing a mbuf to
> a crypto device or another network device that co-exists with mlx5.
> 
> So, while I understand the argument, I think its value is not worth the
> hassle that mlx5_pmd needs to take to achieve it. Did this come from a
> real requirement (from a real implementation)?
> 
Would using VFIO (and the IOMMU) not allow us to provide an equivalent
level of security to what is provided by the current scheme? From what I
see on-list there are a few folks already looking into that area, and
taking advantage of the IOMMU should improve security of all devices in
DPDK.

/Bruce