* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_gcm: support all truncated digest sizes
@ 2018-08-14 0:54 Pablo de Lara
2018-08-24 15:10 ` Kovacevic, Marko
2018-09-26 12:27 ` Akhil Goyal
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Pablo de Lara @ 2018-08-14 0:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: declan.doherty; +Cc: dev, Pablo de Lara
The full digest size of GCM/GMAC algorithms is 16 bytes.
However, it is sometimes truncated to a smaller size (such as in IPSec).
This commit allows a user to generate a digest of any size
up to the full size.
Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
---
drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c | 79 +++++++++++++------
drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c | 8 +-
.../crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h | 6 +-
3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c
index 752e0cd6a..9b4d1f630 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
{
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *auth_xform;
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *aead_xform;
- uint16_t digest_length;
uint8_t key_length;
uint8_t *key;
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
key_length = auth_xform->auth.key.length;
key = auth_xform->auth.key.data;
- digest_length = auth_xform->auth.digest_length;
+ sess->req_digest_length = auth_xform->auth.digest_length;
/* AES-GCM */
} else if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AEAD) {
@@ -73,7 +72,7 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
key = aead_xform->aead.key.data;
sess->aad_length = aead_xform->aead.aad_length;
- digest_length = aead_xform->aead.digest_length;
+ sess->req_digest_length = aead_xform->aead.digest_length;
} else {
AESNI_GCM_LOG(ERR, "Wrong xform type, has to be AEAD or authentication");
return -ENOTSUP;
@@ -106,13 +105,28 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
gcm_ops[sess->key].precomp(key, &sess->gdata_key);
/* Digest check */
- if (digest_length != 16 &&
- digest_length != 12 &&
- digest_length != 8) {
+ if (sess->req_digest_length > 16) {
AESNI_GCM_LOG(ERR, "Invalid digest length");
return -EINVAL;
}
- sess->digest_length = digest_length;
+ /*
+ * Multi-buffer lib supports digest sizes from 4 to 16 bytes
+ * in version 0.50 and sizes of 8, 12 and 16 bytes,
+ * in version 0.49.
+ * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+ * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+ * the requested number of bytes.
+ */
+#if IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 50, 0)
+ if (sess->req_digest_length < 4)
+#else
+ if (sess->req_digest_length != 16 &&
+ sess->req_digest_length != 12 &&
+ sess->req_digest_length != 8)
+#endif
+ sess->gen_digest_length = 16;
+ else
+ sess->gen_digest_length = sess->req_digest_length;
return 0;
}
@@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
struct rte_mbuf *m_src = sym_op->m_src;
uint32_t offset, data_offset, data_length;
uint32_t part_len, total_len, data_len;
+ uint8_t *tag;
if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION ||
session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) {
@@ -263,13 +278,16 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
total_len -= part_len;
}
+ if (session->req_digest_length != session->gen_digest_length)
+ tag = qp->temp_digest;
+ else
+ tag = sym_op->aead.digest.data;
+
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
- sym_op->aead.digest.data,
- (uint64_t)session->digest_length);
+ tag,
+ session->gen_digest_length);
} else if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) {
- uint8_t *auth_tag = qp->temp_digest;
-
qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
iv_ptr,
@@ -298,33 +316,41 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
total_len -= part_len;
}
+ tag = qp->temp_digest;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
- auth_tag,
- (uint64_t)session->digest_length);
+ tag,
+ session->gen_digest_length);
} else if (session->op == AESNI_GMAC_OP_GENERATE) {
qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
iv_ptr,
src,
(uint64_t)data_length);
+ if (session->req_digest_length != session->gen_digest_length)
+ tag = qp->temp_digest;
+ else
+ tag = sym_op->auth.digest.data;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
- sym_op->auth.digest.data,
- (uint64_t)session->digest_length);
+ tag,
+ session->gen_digest_length);
} else { /* AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY */
- uint8_t *auth_tag = qp->temp_digest;
-
qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
iv_ptr,
src,
(uint64_t)data_length);
+ /*
+ * Generate always 16 bytes and later compare only
+ * the bytes passed.
+ */
+ tag = qp->temp_digest;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
- auth_tag,
- (uint64_t)session->digest_length);
+ tag,
+ session->gen_digest_length);
}
return 0;
@@ -361,13 +387,22 @@ post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp,
#ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_AESNI_GCM_DEBUG
rte_hexdump(stdout, "auth tag (orig):",
- digest, session->digest_length);
+ digest, session->req_digest_length);
rte_hexdump(stdout, "auth tag (calc):",
- tag, session->digest_length);
+ tag, session->req_digest_length);
#endif
- if (memcmp(tag, digest, session->digest_length) != 0)
+ if (memcmp(tag, digest, session->req_digest_length) != 0)
op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
+ } else {
+ if (session->req_digest_length != session->gen_digest_length) {
+ if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION)
+ memcpy(op->sym->aead.digest.data, qp->temp_digest,
+ session->req_digest_length);
+ else
+ memcpy(op->sym->auth.digest.data, qp->temp_digest,
+ session->req_digest_length);
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c
index b6b4dd028..c343a393f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_gcm_pmd_capabilities[] = {
.increment = 8
},
.digest_size = {
- .min = 8,
+ .min = 1,
.max = 16,
- .increment = 4
+ .increment = 1
},
.iv_size = {
.min = 12,
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_gcm_pmd_capabilities[] = {
.increment = 8
},
.digest_size = {
- .min = 8,
+ .min = 1,
.max = 16,
- .increment = 4
+ .increment = 1
},
.aad_size = {
.min = 0,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h
index c13a12a57..92b041354 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h
@@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ struct aesni_gcm_session {
/**< IV parameters */
uint16_t aad_length;
/**< AAD length */
- uint16_t digest_length;
- /**< Digest length */
+ uint16_t req_digest_length;
+ /**< Requested digest length */
+ uint16_t gen_digest_length;
+ /**< Generated digest length */
enum aesni_gcm_operation op;
/**< GCM operation type */
enum aesni_gcm_key key;
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_gcm: support all truncated digest sizes
2018-08-14 0:54 [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_gcm: support all truncated digest sizes Pablo de Lara
@ 2018-08-24 15:10 ` Kovacevic, Marko
2018-09-26 12:27 ` Akhil Goyal
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kovacevic, Marko @ 2018-08-24 15:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: De Lara Guarch, Pablo, Doherty, Declan; +Cc: dev, De Lara Guarch, Pablo
> The full digest size of GCM/GMAC algorithms is 16 bytes.
> However, it is sometimes truncated to a smaller size (such as in IPSec).
> This commit allows a user to generate a digest of any size up to the full size.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd.c | 79 +++++++++++++------
> drivers/crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_ops.c | 8 +-
> .../crypto/aesni_gcm/aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h | 6 +-
> 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
Acked-by: Marko Kovacevic <marko.kovacevic@intel.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_gcm: support all truncated digest sizes
2018-08-14 0:54 [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_gcm: support all truncated digest sizes Pablo de Lara
2018-08-24 15:10 ` Kovacevic, Marko
@ 2018-09-26 12:27 ` Akhil Goyal
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Akhil Goyal @ 2018-09-26 12:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pablo de Lara, declan.doherty; +Cc: dev
On 8/14/2018 6:24 AM, Pablo de Lara wrote:
> The full digest size of GCM/GMAC algorithms is 16 bytes.
> However, it is sometimes truncated to a smaller size (such as in IPSec).
> This commit allows a user to generate a digest of any size
> up to the full size.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
> ---
>
Applied to dpdk-next-crypto
Thanks
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2018-08-24 15:10 ` Kovacevic, Marko
2018-09-26 12:27 ` Akhil Goyal
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