From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from dpdk.org (dpdk.org [92.243.14.124]) by inbox.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38AC7A052E; Mon, 9 Mar 2020 15:45:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from [92.243.14.124] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 163A31C0AC; Mon, 9 Mar 2020 15:45:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-2.mimecast.com [205.139.110.61]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 095391C07E for ; Mon, 9 Mar 2020 15:45:20 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1583765120; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=dVIMvczLuKFACQSskkbHcCbW08ZkHMcywxELPb+Jky8=; b=iJMmCNDdl/nlpxZbTlkvpa8QoQcgEfRYnwq1CmVgy6DjOKOP+dXbMyqujWnLx7B8lRGbA7 2FTMK0OXT5C0SzwpSWY0Lx7DIc6A/ZiaH3WQE0NWQsZVEMN3fFZnqKnFtHJJ4Yd/Hkpqug qJYpC0bbaXG4l3V2avA4o+lEG1ntVx8= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-270-N4_LweWrOjqdCQaMjFMs7Q-1; Mon, 09 Mar 2020 10:45:16 -0400 X-MC-Unique: N4_LweWrOjqdCQaMjFMs7Q-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F41B913F5; Mon, 9 Mar 2020 14:45:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from w520.home (ovpn-116-28.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.116.28]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEFCA5D9E2; Mon, 9 Mar 2020 14:45:13 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 08:45:13 -0600 From: Alex Williamson To: Jason Wang Cc: "Tian, Kevin" , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "dev@dpdk.org" , "mtosatti@redhat.com" , "thomas@monjalon.net" , "bluca@debian.org" , "jerinjacobk@gmail.com" , "Richardson, Bruce" , "cohuck@redhat.com" Message-ID: <20200309084513.2b7ae5e4@w520.home> In-Reply-To: References: <158213716959.17090.8399427017403507114.stgit@gimli.home> <20200305101406.02703e2a@w520.home> <3e8db1d0-8afc-f1e9-e857-aead4717fa11@redhat.com> <20200306092445.1bd4611c@x1.home> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 0/7] vfio/pci: SR-IOV support X-BeenThere: dev@dpdk.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: DPDK patches and discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: dev-bounces@dpdk.org Sender: "dev" On Mon, 9 Mar 2020 11:36:46 +0800 Jason Wang wrote: > On 2020/3/7 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=8812:24, Alex Williamson wrote: > > On Fri, 6 Mar 2020 11:35:21 +0800 > > Jason Wang wrote: > > =20 > >> On 2020/3/6 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=881:14, Alex Williamson wrote: =20 > >>> On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 14:09:07 +0800 > >>> Jason Wang wrote: > >>> =20 > >>>> On 2020/2/25 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=8810:33, Tian, Kevin wrote: =20 > >>>>>> From: Alex Williamson > >>>>>> Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 2:54 AM > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Changes since v1 are primarily to patch 3/7 where the commit log is > >>>>>> rewritten, along with option parsing and failure logging based on > >>>>>> upstream discussions. The primary user visible difference is that > >>>>>> option parsing is now much more strict. If a vf_token option is > >>>>>> provided that cannot be used, we generate an error. As a result of > >>>>>> this, opening a PF with a vf_token option will serve as a mechanis= m of > >>>>>> setting the vf_token. This seems like a more user friendly API th= an > >>>>>> the alternative of sometimes requiring the option (VFs in use) and > >>>>>> sometimes rejecting it, and upholds our desire that the option is > >>>>>> always either used or rejected. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This also means that the VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl is not the only > >>>>>> means of setting the VF token, which might call into question whet= her > >>>>>> we absolutely need this new ioctl. Currently I'm keeping it becau= se I > >>>>>> can imagine use cases, for example if a hypervisor were to support > >>>>>> SR-IOV, the PF device might be opened without consideration for a = VF > >>>>>> token and we'd require the hypservisor to close and re-open the PF= in > >>>>>> order to set a known VF token, which is impractical. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Series overview (same as provided with v1): =20 > >>>>> Thanks for doing this! > >>>>> =20 > >>>>>> The synopsis of this series is that we have an ongoing desire to d= rive > >>>>>> PCIe SR-IOV PFs from userspace with VFIO. There's an immediate ne= ed > >>>>>> for this with DPDK drivers and potentially interesting future use = =20 > >>>>> Can you provide a link to the DPDK discussion? > >>>>> =20 > >>>>>> cases in virtualization. We've been reluctant to add this support > >>>>>> previously due to the dependency and trust relationship between the > >>>>>> VF device and PF driver. Minimally the PF driver can induce a den= ial > >>>>>> of service to the VF, but depending on the specific implementation, > >>>>>> the PF driver might also be responsible for moving data between VFs > >>>>>> or have direct access to the state of the VF, including data or st= ate > >>>>>> otherwise private to the VF or VF driver. =20 > >>>>> Just a loud thinking. While the motivation of VF token sounds reaso= nable > >>>>> to me, I'm curious why the same concern is not raised in other usag= es. > >>>>> For example, there is no such design in virtio framework, where the > >>>>> virtio device could also be restarted, putting in separate process = (vhost-user), > >>>>> and even in separate VM (virtio-vhost-user), etc. =20 > >>>> AFAIK, the restart could only be triggered by either VM or qemu. But > >>>> yes, the datapath could be offloaded. > >>>> > >>>> But I'm not sure introducing another dedicated mechanism is better t= han > >>>> using the exist generic POSIX mechanism to make sure the connection > >>>> (AF_UINX) is secure. > >>>> > >>>> =20 > >>>>> Of course the para- > >>>>> virtualized attribute of virtio implies some degree of trust, but a= s you > >>>>> mentioned many SR-IOV implementations support VF->PF communication > >>>>> which also implies some level of trust. It's perfectly fine if VFIO= just tries > >>>>> to do better than other sub-systems, but knowing how other people > >>>>> tackle the similar problem may make the whole picture clearer. =F0= =9F=98=8A > >>>>> > >>>>> +Jason. =20 > >>>> I'm not quite sure e.g allowing userspace PF driver with kernel VF > >>>> driver would not break the assumption of kernel security model. At l= east > >>>> we should forbid a unprivileged PF driver running in userspace. =20 > >>> It might be useful to have your opinion on this series, because that's > >>> exactly what we're trying to do here. Various environments, DPDK > >>> specifically, want a userspace PF driver. This series takes steps to > >>> mitigate the risk of having such a driver, such as requiring this VF > >>> token interface to extend the VFIO interface and validate participati= on > >>> around a PF that is not considered trusted by the kernel. =20 > >> > >> I may miss something. But what happens if: > >> > >> - PF driver is running by unprivileged user > >> - PF is programmed to send translated DMA request > >> - Then unprivileged user can mangle the kernel data =20 > > ATS is a security risk regardless of SR-IOV, how does this change it? > > Thanks, =20 >=20 >=20 > My understanding is the ATS only happen for some bugous devices. Some=20 > hardware has on-chip IOMMU, this probably means unprivileged userspace=20 > PF driver can control the on-chip IOMMU in this case. Again, how does this relate to SR-IOV? A PF is currently assignable regardless of the support in this series. Thanks, Alex