Series-acked-by: Kai Ji <kai.ji@intel.com>




From: Nicolau, Radu <radu.nicolau@intel.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2025 10:23
To: dev@dpdk.org <dev@dpdk.org>
Cc: Nicolau, Radu <radu.nicolau@intel.com>; Ji, Kai <kai.ji@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] crypto/qat: Add ECDH, ECDSA and ECPM capabilities

Add missing eliptic curves capabilities.
Small fixes on ECDH implementation.

Signed-off-by: Radu Nicolau <radu.nicolau@intel.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qat/dev/qat_asym_pmd_gen1.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_asym.c              |  9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/dev/qat_asym_pmd_gen1.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/dev/qat_asym_pmd_gen1.c
index 67b1892c32..20001bd1cc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/dev/qat_asym_pmd_gen1.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/dev/qat_asym_pmd_gen1.c
@@ -38,6 +38,19 @@ static struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities qat_asym_crypto_caps_gen1[] = {
                         (1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_ENCRYPT) |
                         (1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_DECRYPT)),
                         64, 512, 64),
+       QAT_ASYM_CAP(ECDH,
+                       ((1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_KE_PUB_KEY_GENERATE) |
+                       (1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_KE_SHARED_SECRET_COMPUTE) |
+                       (1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_KE_PUB_KEY_VERIFY)),
+                       64, 512, 64),
+       QAT_ASYM_CAP(ECDSA,
+                       ((1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_SIGN) |
+                       (1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_VERIFY)),
+                       64, 512, 64),
+       QAT_ASYM_CAP(ECPM,
+                       ((1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_SIGN) |
+                       (1 << RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_VERIFY)),
+                       64, 512, 64),
         RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_asym.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_asym.c
index d8a1406819..bd22fc0a6f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_asym.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_asym.c
@@ -801,11 +801,14 @@ ecdh_set_input(struct icp_qat_fw_pke_request *qat_req,
                 SET_PKE_LN(asym_op->ecdh.priv_key, qat_func_alignsize, 0);
                 SET_PKE_LN_EC(curve[curve_id], x, 1);
                 SET_PKE_LN_EC(curve[curve_id], y, 2);
-       } else {
+       } else if (asym_op->ecdh.ke_type == RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_KE_SHARED_SECRET_COMPUTE) {
                 SET_PKE_LN(asym_op->ecdh.priv_key, qat_func_alignsize, 0);
                 SET_PKE_LN(asym_op->ecdh.pub_key.x, qat_func_alignsize, 1);
                 SET_PKE_LN(asym_op->ecdh.pub_key.y, qat_func_alignsize, 2);
+       } else {
+               return -EINVAL;
         }
+
         SET_PKE_LN_EC(curve[curve_id], a, 3);
         SET_PKE_LN_EC(curve[curve_id], b, 4);
         SET_PKE_LN_EC(curve[curve_id], p, 5);
@@ -894,11 +897,13 @@ ecdh_collect(struct rte_crypto_asym_op *asym_op,
                 asym_op->ecdh.pub_key.y.length = alg_bytesize;
                 x = asym_op->ecdh.pub_key.x.data;
                 y = asym_op->ecdh.pub_key.y.data;
-       } else {
+       } else if (asym_op->ecdh.ke_type == RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_KE_SHARED_SECRET_COMPUTE) {
                 asym_op->ecdh.shared_secret.x.length = alg_bytesize;
                 asym_op->ecdh.shared_secret.y.length = alg_bytesize;
                 x = asym_op->ecdh.shared_secret.x.data;
                 y = asym_op->ecdh.shared_secret.y.data;
+       } else {
+               return -EINVAL;
         }
 
         rte_memcpy(x, &cookie->output_array[0][ltrim], alg_bytesize);
--
2.50.1