From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mails.dpdk.org (mails.dpdk.org [217.70.189.124]) by inbox.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EFA2A0C4A; Wed, 7 Jul 2021 13:23:17 +0200 (CEST) Received: from [217.70.189.124] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mails.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 526AD406FF; Wed, 7 Jul 2021 13:23:17 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail-pg1-f180.google.com (mail-pg1-f180.google.com [209.85.215.180]) by mails.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE83C406B4 for ; Wed, 7 Jul 2021 13:23:15 +0200 (CEST) Received: by mail-pg1-f180.google.com with SMTP id f5so1896832pgv.3 for ; Wed, 07 Jul 2021 04:23:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=Peq5DZYfPP3GZovV7LQTaeqfyEVFR7EauK0gahL49ao=; b=qjBo8fHOpVGq7p0a5plo7wXm9iq1hotx9njaSHKO7Jkp1nmfw4WsUEWhc8EICIc3G7 wswwsyPNMohNlHeMOevcswZcqy+4JLAufH1SiZBEF8lowNg4Dd2hlKABmiAy+r3F4jGE VJQOti9ksWG8nxqlL9fzq6OiDQjg78FMoGhsKuCFkx2wIUkRfQDRVeuR094BXQ1gNBl5 GGAa/pOUwrIdm+5ORWoSikk8GFIEKiOgRDubIszoipAT6igfvNNAamah04MhIRwgwGNL 1jpXUV282yWe6Obk2IMzExSPShiVCiJbqhMES/n95uwboQEAmDwEwaUCxd9zffAP+eDZ Y4GA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=Peq5DZYfPP3GZovV7LQTaeqfyEVFR7EauK0gahL49ao=; b=Uhb5jU6/+otBxMUUllsFzoFqfZ+NUmV+tFX5zredDnHVkh2uD+P72JJASfbUsT6pYF LI5nxQuDneCunQ1h0y4aMEdDcif+a0Sv6dwCJi9a5A3n5KNxBg00cHhvndDuVFHe10oj hKM110nHa64DCFRKvle789qf12QrtigYmrOlEZxwU0gcVNYXZjhCbPm+xpXCewOZtfyC 0gH6WnnBYF9cO4/CtGP71xJlwYKEcXaHFYS1UFKmJhcqB/q3KPBujIG7+mpmZ7Ns09EC LCTU0QMDOdZ4z7UQTwNjxIii67EBvCVkszMtHwZVHqXQdCngr1j8xHuxH+q7WZlSJeBp eFlQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532Mtll8dqN1fVCzmTPmpm9sHZqPuI/99SHbKW+KNsKYPxGtMLMm 5O5VtofPjluG3evpmRILqvo= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzolnBouf594p/snFsOgQyRWbESVFwHgqQ4nSDw52g6VFTuDa/wWI+Yszn4Am1Gs6kGeGfQ5Q== X-Received: by 2002:a62:3244:0:b029:308:22b0:52ff with SMTP id y65-20020a6232440000b029030822b052ffmr24743659pfy.68.1625656995060; Wed, 07 Jul 2021 04:23:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from gmail.com ([1.6.215.26]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l83sm14831321pfd.140.2021.07.07.04.23.11 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 07 Jul 2021 04:23:14 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 16:52:48 +0530 From: Nithin Dabilpuram To: "Ananyev, Konstantin" Cc: Akhil Goyal , "dev@dpdk.org" , "hemant.agrawal@nxp.com" , "thomas@monjalon.net" , "g.singh@nxp.com" , "Yigit, Ferruh" , "Zhang, Roy Fan" , "olivier.matz@6wind.com" , "jerinj@marvell.com" Message-ID: References: <20210624102848.3878788-1-gakhil@marvell.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 1/2] security: enforce semantics for Tx inline processing X-BeenThere: dev@dpdk.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: DPDK patches and discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: dev-bounces@dpdk.org Sender: "dev" On Wed, Jul 07, 2021 at 09:59:10AM +0000, Ananyev, Konstantin wrote: > > > > > > > > > For Tx inline processing, when RTE_SECURITY_TX_OLOAD_NEED_MDATA is > > > > > > > > set, rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() needs to be called for pkts > > > > > > > > to associate a Security session with a mbuf before submitting > > > > > > > > to Ethdev Tx. This is apart from setting PKT_TX_SEC_OFFLOAD in > > > > > > > > mbuf.ol_flags. rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() is also used to > > > > > > > > set some opaque metadata in mbuf for PMD's use. > > > > > > > > This patch updates documentation that rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() > > > > > > > > should be called only with mbuf containing Layer 3 and above data. > > > > > > > > This behaviour is consistent with existing PMD's such as ixgbe. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tx, not all net PMD's/HW can parse packet and identify > > > > > > > > L2 header and L3 header locations on Tx. This is inline with other > > > > > > > > Tx offloads requirements such as L3 checksum, L4 checksum offload, > > > > > > > > etc, where mbuf.l2_len, mbuf.l3_len etc, needs to be set for > > > > > > > > HW to be able to generate checksum. Since Inline IPSec is also > > > > > > > > such a Tx offload, some PMD's at least need mbuf.l2_len to be > > > > > > > > valid to find L3 header and perform Outbound IPSec processing. > > > > > > > > Hence, this patch updates documentation to enforce setting > > > > > > > > mbuf.l2_len while setting PKT_TX_SEC_OFFLOAD in mbuf.ol_flags > > > > > > > > for Inline IPSec Crypto / Protocol offload processing to > > > > > > > > work on Tx. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Nithin Dabilpuram > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Akhil Goyal > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > > doc/guides/nics/features.rst | 2 ++ > > > > > > > > doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst | 6 +++++- > > > > > > > > lib/mbuf/rte_mbuf_core.h | 2 ++ > > > > > > > > 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/doc/guides/nics/features.rst b/doc/guides/nics/features.rst > > > > > > > > index 403c2b03a..414baf14f 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/doc/guides/nics/features.rst > > > > > > > > +++ b/doc/guides/nics/features.rst > > > > > > > > @@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ of protocol operations. See Security library and PMD documentation for more deta > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > * **[uses] rte_eth_rxconf,rte_eth_rxmode**: ``offloads:DEV_RX_OFFLOAD_SECURITY``, > > > > > > > > * **[uses] rte_eth_txconf,rte_eth_txmode**: ``offloads:DEV_TX_OFFLOAD_SECURITY``. > > > > > > > > +* **[uses] mbuf**: ``mbuf.l2_len``. > > > > > > > > * **[implements] rte_security_ops**: ``session_create``, ``session_update``, > > > > > > > > ``session_stats_get``, ``session_destroy``, ``set_pkt_metadata``, ``capabilities_get``. > > > > > > > > * **[provides] rte_eth_dev_info**: ``rx_offload_capa,rx_queue_offload_capa:DEV_RX_OFFLOAD_SECURITY``, > > > > > > > > @@ -451,6 +452,7 @@ protocol operations. See security library and PMD documentation for more details > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > * **[uses] rte_eth_rxconf,rte_eth_rxmode**: ``offloads:DEV_RX_OFFLOAD_SECURITY``, > > > > > > > > * **[uses] rte_eth_txconf,rte_eth_txmode**: ``offloads:DEV_TX_OFFLOAD_SECURITY``. > > > > > > > > +* **[uses] mbuf**: ``mbuf.l2_len``. > > > > > > > > * **[implements] rte_security_ops**: ``session_create``, ``session_update``, > > > > > > > > ``session_stats_get``, ``session_destroy``, ``set_pkt_metadata``, ``get_userdata``, > > > > > > > > ``capabilities_get``. > > > > > > > > diff --git a/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst b/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst > > > > > > > > index f72bc8a78..7b68c698d 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst > > > > > > > > +++ b/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst > > > > > > > > @@ -560,7 +560,11 @@ created by the application is attached to the security session by the API > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For Inline Crypto and Inline protocol offload, device specific defined metadata is > > > > > > > > updated in the mbuf using ``rte_security_set_pkt_metadata()`` if > > > > > > > > -``DEV_TX_OFFLOAD_SEC_NEED_MDATA`` is set. > > > > > > > > +``RTE_SECURITY_TX_OLOAD_NEED_MDATA`` is set. ``rte_security_set_pkt_metadata()`` > > > > > > > > +should be called on mbuf only with Layer 3 and above data present and > > > > > > > > +``mbuf.data_off`` should be pointing to Layer 3 Header. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hmm... not sure why mbuf.data_off should point to L3 hdr. > > > > > > > Who will add L2 hdr to the packet in that case? > > > > > > > Or did you mean ``mbuf.data_off + mbuf.l2_len`` here? > > > > > > > > > > > > That is the semantics I was trying to define. I think below are the sequence of > > > > > > operations to be done for ipsec processing, > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. receive_pkt() > > > > > > 2. strip_l2_hdr() > > > > > > 3. Do policy lookup () > > > > > > 4. Call rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() if pkt needs to be encrypted with a > > > > > > particular SA. Now pkt only has L3 and above data. > > > > > > 5. Do route_lookup() > > > > > > 6. add_l2hdr() which might be different from stripped l2hdr. > > > > > > 7. Send packet out. > > > > > > > > > > > > The above sequence is what I believe the current poll mode worker thread in > > > > > > ipsec-secgw is following. > > > > > > > > > > That's just a sample app, it doesn't mean it has to be the only possible way. > > > > > > > > > > > While in event mode, step 2 and step 6 are missing. > > > > > > > > > > I think this L2 hdr manipulation is totally optional. > > > > > If your rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() implementation really needs to know L3 hdr offset (not sure why?), > > > > Since rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() is PMD specific function ptr call, we are currently doing some pre-processing > > > > here before submitting packet to inline IPSec via rte_eth_tx_burst(). This saves us cycles later in rte_eth_tx_burst(). > > > > If we cannot know for sure, the pkt content at the time of rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() call, then I think > > > > having a PMD specific callback is not much of use except for saving SA priv data to rte_mbuf. > > > > > > > > > then I suppose we can add a requirement that l2_len has to be set properly before calling rte_security_set_pkt_metadata(). > > > > > > > > This is also fine with us. > > > > > > Ok, so to make sure we are on the same page, you propose: > > > 1. before calling rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() mbuf.l2_len should be properly set. > > > 2. after rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() and before rte_eth_tx_burst() packet contents > > > at [mbuf.l2_len, mbuf.pkt_len) can't be modified? > > Yes. > > > > > > > > Is that correct understanding? > > > If yes, I wonder how 2) will correlate with rte_eth_tx_prepare() concept? > > > > Since our PMD doesn't have a prepare function, I missed that but, since > > rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() is only used for Inline Crypto/Protocol via > > a rte_eth_dev, and both rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() and rte_eth_tx_prepare() > > are callbacks from same PMD, do you see any issue ? > > > > The restriction is from user side, data is not supposed to be modified unless > > rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() is called again. > > Yep, I do have a concern here. > Right now it is perfectly valid to do something like that: > rte_security_set_pkt_metadata(..., mb, ...); > /* can modify contents of the packet */ > rte_eth_tx_prepare(..., &mb, 1); > rte_eth_tx_burst(..., &mb, 1); > > With the new restrictions you are proposing it wouldn't be allowed any more. You can still modify L2 header and IPSEC is only concerned about L3 and above. I think insisting that rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() be called after all L3 and above header modifications is no a problem. I guess existing ixgbe/txgbe PMD which are the ones only implementing the call back are already expecting the same ? > > > > > If your question is can't we do the preprocessing in rte_eth_tx_prepare() for > > security, > > Yes, that was my thought. > > > my only argument was that since there is already a hit in > > rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() to PMD specific callback and > > struct rte_security_session is passed as an argument to it, it is more benefitial to > > do security related pre-processing there. > > Yes, it would be extra callback call that way. > Though tx_prepare() accepts burst of packets, so the overhead > of function call will be spread around the whole burst, and I presume > shouldn't be too high. > > > Also rte_eth_tx_prepare() if implemented will be called for both security and > > non-security pkts. > > Yes, but tx_prepare() can distinguish (by ol_flags and/or other field contents) which > modifications are required for the packet. But the major issues I see are 1. tx_prepare() doesn't take rte_security_session as argument though ol_flags has security flag. In our case, we need to know the security session details to do things. 2. AFAIU tx_prepare() is not mandatory as per spec and even by default disabled under compile time macro RTE_ETHDEV_TX_PREPARE_NOOP. 3. Even if we do tx_prepare(), rte_security_set_pkt_mdata() is mandatory to associate struct rte_security_session to a pkt as unlike ol_flags, there is no direct space to do the same. So I think instead of enforcing yet another callback tx_prepare() for inline security processing, it can be done via security specific set_pkt_metadata(). I'm fine to introduce a burst call for the same(I was thinking to propose it in future) to compensate for the overhead. If rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() was not a PMD specific function ptr call and rte_mbuf had space for struct rte_security_session pointer, then then I guess it would have been better to do the way you proposed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This patch is trying to enforce semantics as above so that > > > > > > rte_security_set_pkt_metadata() can predict what comes in the pkt when he is > > > > > > called. > > > > > > > > > > > > I also think above sequence is what Linux kernel stack or other stacks follow. > > > > > > Does it makes sense ? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Once called, > > > > > > > > +Layer 3 and above data cannot be modified or moved around unless > > > > > > > > +``rte_security_set_pkt_metadata()`` is called again. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For inline protocol offloaded ingress traffic, the application can register a > > > > > > > > pointer, ``userdata`` , in the security session. When the packet is received, > > > > > > > > diff --git a/lib/mbuf/rte_mbuf_core.h b/lib/mbuf/rte_mbuf_core.h > > > > > > > > index bb38d7f58..9d8e3ddc8 100644 > > > > > > > > --- a/lib/mbuf/rte_mbuf_core.h > > > > > > > > +++ b/lib/mbuf/rte_mbuf_core.h > > > > > > > > @@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ extern "C" { > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > /** > > > > > > > > * Request security offload processing on the TX packet. > > > > > > > > + * To use Tx security offload, the user needs to fill l2_len in mbuf > > > > > > > > + * indicating L2 header size and where L3 header starts. > > > > > > > > */ > > > > > > > > #define PKT_TX_SEC_OFFLOAD (1ULL << 43) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > 2.25.1 > > > > > > >