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* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
@ 2018-11-15 17:24 Fan Zhang
  2018-12-11 14:24 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] " Fan Zhang
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-11-15 17:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch adds AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB
PMD. The unit test is updated accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
---
This patch targets 19.02 release.

 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c     | 127 +++++++++++++++++++------
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c |  25 +++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                     |  13 +++
 3 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
index 83250e32c..3ead8a61f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
@@ -177,6 +177,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const struct aesni_mb_op_fns *mb_ops,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_128)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_192)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_256)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,11 +909,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -879,19 +950,10 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
-	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +995,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
index f3eff2685..1ca6baafa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
@@ -416,6 +416,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
index 84065eb49..8b4694c13 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
@@ -9341,6 +9341,19 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_decryption_sessionless_test_case_1),
 
+		/** AES GMAC Authentication */
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_3),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_3),
 
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_chain_mb_all),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_cipheronly_mb_all),
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-11-15 17:24 [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-11 14:24 ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-18 13:51   ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3] " Fan Zhang
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-11 14:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch adds AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB
PMD. The unit test is updated accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
---
v2:
- updated documentation

 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst             |   3 +
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c     | 127 +++++++++++++++++++------
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c |  25 +++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                     |  13 +++
 4 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
index 63e060d75..c7624fb00 100644
--- a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Hash algorithms:
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA512_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_XCBC_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_CMAC
+* RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC
 
 AEAD algorithms:
 
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ Limitations
 
 * Chained mbufs are not supported.
 * Only in-place is currently supported (destination address is the same as source address).
+* RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC only works properly when Intel multi buffer library
+  is version 0.51.0 or older.
 
 
 Installation
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
index 83250e32c..3ead8a61f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
@@ -177,6 +177,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const struct aesni_mb_op_fns *mb_ops,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_128)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_192)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_256)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,11 +909,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -879,19 +950,10 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
-	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +995,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
index f3eff2685..1ca6baafa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
@@ -416,6 +416,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
index 84065eb49..8b4694c13 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
@@ -9341,6 +9341,19 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_decryption_sessionless_test_case_1),
 
+		/** AES GMAC Authentication */
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_3),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_3),
 
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_chain_mb_all),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_cipheronly_mb_all),
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-12-11 14:24 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] " Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-18 13:51   ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-18 15:22     ` Akhil Goyal
  2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-18 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch adds AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB
PMD. The unit test is updated accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
v3:
- rebased on top of latest code.
- updated release note.

v2:
- updated documentation.

 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst                 |   6 +-
 doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst             |   5 +
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c         | 127 ++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_next.c    | 126 +++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c     |  25 ++++
 .../crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_next.c    |  25 ++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                         |  13 +++
 7 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
index 81183b606..71b2cf2c7 100644
--- a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ Hash algorithms:
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA256_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA384_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA512_HMAC
+* RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_XCBC_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_CMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA1
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ Hash algorithms:
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA384
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA512
 
+
 AEAD algorithms:
 
 * RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM
@@ -56,8 +58,8 @@ Limitations
 
 * Chained mbufs are not supported.
 * Only in-place is currently supported (destination address is the same as source address).
-* RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM only works properly when the multi-buffer library is
-  0.51.0 or older.
+* RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM and RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC only works properly when
+  Intel multi buffer library is version 0.51.0 or older.
 
 
 Installation
diff --git a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
index 0a39723b2..671e9c681 100644
--- a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ New Features
      Added a new performance test tool to test the compressdev PMD. The tool tests
      compression ratio and compression throughput.
 
+* **Updated the AESNI MB PMD.**
+
+  The AESNI MB PMD has been updated with additional support for the AES-GMAC
+  authentication only algorithm.
+
 
 Removed Items
 -------------
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
index 83250e32c..3ead8a61f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
@@ -177,6 +177,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const struct aesni_mb_op_fns *mb_ops,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_128)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_192)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_256)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,11 +909,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -879,19 +950,10 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
-	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +995,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_next.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_next.c
index c794652ce..4e31735ca 100755
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_next.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_next.c
@@ -174,6 +174,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const MB_MGR *mb_mgr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES128_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES192_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES256_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,11 +909,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -879,19 +950,11 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
 	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +996,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
index f3eff2685..1ca6baafa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
@@ -416,6 +416,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_next.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_next.c
index c57065d0f..c90f6baa3 100755
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_next.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_next.c
@@ -465,6 +465,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
index 84065eb49..8b4694c13 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
@@ -9341,6 +9341,19 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_decryption_sessionless_test_case_1),
 
+		/** AES GMAC Authentication */
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_3),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_3),
 
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_chain_mb_all),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_cipheronly_mb_all),
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-12-18 13:51   ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3] " Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-18 15:22     ` Akhil Goyal
  2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Akhil Goyal @ 2018-12-18 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Fan Zhang, dev



On 12/18/2018 7:21 PM, Fan Zhang wrote:
> This patch adds AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB
> PMD. The unit test is updated accordingly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
> ---
> v3:
> - rebased on top of latest code.
> - updated release note.
>
> v2:
> - updated documentation.
>
Applied to dpdk-next-crypto


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-12-18 13:51   ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3] " Fan Zhang
  2018-12-18 15:22     ` Akhil Goyal
@ 2018-12-19 21:42     ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 1/3] " Fan Zhang
                         ` (3 more replies)
  1 sibling, 4 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patchset adds the AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB PMD,
including the driver code, cryptodev unit test, and documentation updates.

This patchset is built on top of the patchset "use architecure independent
macros" (https://mails.dpdk.org/archives/dev/2018-December/121680.html)

Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>

v4:
- rebased on top of latest "use architecure independent macros" patchset.
- patch split.

v3:
- rebased on top of latest code.
- updated release note.

v2:
- updated documentation.

Fan Zhang (3):
  crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  test: add aesni-mb gmac test
  doc: update release note and PMD information

 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst                 |   2 +
 doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst             |   5 +
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c         | 126 +++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c  | 127 ++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c     |  25 ++++
 .../crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c  |  25 ++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                         |  24 ++++
 7 files changed, 281 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 1/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 21:42       ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test Fan Zhang
                         ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch updates the AESNI-MB PMD to add AES-GMAC support.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c         | 126 +++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c  | 127 ++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c     |  25 ++++
 .../crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c  |  25 ++++
 4 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
index 2c25b7b32..d34cbc36a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
@@ -173,6 +173,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const MB_MGR *mb_mgr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES128_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES192_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES256_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -735,8 +783,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -776,7 +832,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -788,7 +845,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -826,11 +884,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -854,19 +925,11 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
 	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -908,13 +971,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
index 83250e32c..56ce54946 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
@@ -177,6 +177,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const struct aesni_mb_op_fns *mb_ops,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_128)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_192)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_256)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,13 +909,26 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
+
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -879,19 +950,10 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
-	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +995,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
index 5788e37d1..56d409b4b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
@@ -360,6 +360,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
index f3eff2685..1ca6baafa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
@@ -416,6 +416,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test
  2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 1/3] " Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 21:42       ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 3/3] doc: update release note and PMD information Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch adds the GMAC test cases to AESNI-MB crypto unit test.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
index 84065eb49..f17054520 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
 #include <rte_cryptodev_scheduler_operations.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_AESNI_MB
+#include <intel-ipsec-mb.h>
+#endif
+
 #include <rte_lcore.h>
 
 #include "test.h"
@@ -41,6 +45,11 @@
 #define VDEV_ARGS_SIZE 100
 #define MAX_NB_SESSIONS            4
 
+#if !defined(IMB_VERSION_NUM)
+#define IMB_VERSION(a, b, c) (((a) << 16) + ((b) << 8) + (c))
+#define IMB_VERSION_NUM IMB_VERSION(0, 49, 0)
+#endif
+
 static int gbl_driver_id;
 
 struct crypto_testsuite_params {
@@ -9228,6 +9237,7 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 	.setup = testsuite_setup,
 	.teardown = testsuite_teardown,
 	.unit_test_cases = {
+#if IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 51, 0)
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_encryption_test_case_1),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
@@ -9341,6 +9351,20 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_decryption_sessionless_test_case_1),
 
+		/** AES GMAC Authentication */
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_3),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_3),
+#endif /* IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 51, 0) */
 
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_chain_mb_all),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_cipheronly_mb_all),
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 3/3] doc: update release note and PMD information
  2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 1/3] " Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 21:42       ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch updates the release note and AESNI-MD PMD documentation.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst     | 2 ++
 doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
index 12532c63e..98082595d 100644
--- a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Hash algorithms:
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA512_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_XCBC_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_CMAC
+* RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_GMAC
 
 AEAD algorithms:
 
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ Limitations
 
 * Chained mbufs are not supported.
 * Only in-place is currently supported (destination address is the same as source address).
+* RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_GMAC is supported by library version v0.51 or later.
 
 
 Installation
diff --git a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
index 8deb68b9a..48b183e81 100644
--- a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ New Features
   * Added the handler to get firmware version string.
   * Added support for multicast filtering.
 
+* **Updated the AESNI MB PMD.**
+
+  The AESNI MB PMD has been updated with additional support for the AES-GMAC
+  authentication only algorithm.
+
 
 Removed Items
 -------------
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
                         ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 3/3] doc: update release note and PMD information Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 22:04       ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 1/3] " Fan Zhang
                           ` (3 more replies)
  3 siblings, 4 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patchset adds the AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB PMD,
including the driver code, cryptodev unit test, and documentation updates.

This patchset is built on top of the patchset "use architecure independent
macros" (https://mails.dpdk.org/archives/dev/2018-December/121680.html)

Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>

v5:
- changed IMB_VERSION_NUM definition place.

v4:
- rebased on top of latest "use architecure independent macros" patchset.
- patch split.

v3:
- rebased on top of latest code.
- updated release note.

v2:
- updated documentation.

Fan Zhang (3):
  crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  test: add aesni-mb gmac test
  doc: update release note and pmd info

 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst                 |   2 +
 doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst             |   5 +
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c         | 126 +++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c  | 127 ++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c     |  25 ++++
 .../crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c  |  25 ++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                         |  15 +++
 test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h       |   9 ++
 8 files changed, 281 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 1/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support
  2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 22:04         ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test Fan Zhang
                           ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch updates the AESNI-MB PMD to add AES-GMAC support.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c         | 126 +++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c  | 127 ++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c     |  25 ++++
 .../crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c  |  25 ++++
 4 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
index 2c25b7b32..d34cbc36a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
@@ -173,6 +173,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const MB_MGR *mb_mgr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES128_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES192_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES256_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -735,8 +783,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -776,7 +832,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -788,7 +845,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -826,11 +884,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -854,19 +925,11 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
 	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -908,13 +971,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
index 83250e32c..56ce54946 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
@@ -177,6 +177,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const struct aesni_mb_op_fns *mb_ops,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_128)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_192)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_256)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,13 +909,26 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
+
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -879,19 +950,10 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
-	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +995,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
index 5788e37d1..56d409b4b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
@@ -360,6 +360,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
index f3eff2685..1ca6baafa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
@@ -416,6 +416,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test
  2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 1/3] " Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 22:04         ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 3/3] doc: update release note and pmd info Fan Zhang
  2018-12-20 12:07         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC Fan Zhang
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch adds the GMAC test cases to AESNI-MB crypto unit test.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                   | 15 +++++++++++++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h |  9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
index 84065eb49..f437321ac 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
@@ -9228,6 +9228,7 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 	.setup = testsuite_setup,
 	.teardown = testsuite_teardown,
 	.unit_test_cases = {
+#if IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 51, 0)
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_encryption_test_case_1),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
@@ -9341,6 +9342,20 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_decryption_sessionless_test_case_1),
 
+		/** AES GMAC Authentication */
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_3),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_3),
+#endif /* IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 51, 0) */
 
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_chain_mb_all),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_cipheronly_mb_all),
diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h b/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h
index a02dfb3c3..8964a3bac 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #ifndef TEST_CRYPTODEV_HASH_TEST_VECTORS_H_
 #define TEST_CRYPTODEV_HASH_TEST_VECTORS_H_
 
+#ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_AESNI_MB
+#include <intel-ipsec-mb.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IMB_VERSION_NUM)
+#define IMB_VERSION(a, b, c) (((a) << 16) + ((b) << 8) + (c))
+#define IMB_VERSION_NUM IMB_VERSION(0, 49, 0)
+#endif
+
 static const uint8_t plaintext_hash[] = {
 	"What a lousy earth! He wondered how many people "
 	"were destitute that same night even in his own "
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 3/3] doc: update release note and pmd info
  2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 1/3] " Fan Zhang
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-19 22:04         ` Fan Zhang
  2018-12-20 12:07         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC Fan Zhang
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-19 22:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal

This patch updates the release note and AESNI-MD PMD documentation.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst     | 2 ++
 doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
index 12532c63e..98082595d 100644
--- a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Hash algorithms:
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA512_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_XCBC_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_CMAC
+* RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_GMAC
 
 AEAD algorithms:
 
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ Limitations
 
 * Chained mbufs are not supported.
 * Only in-place is currently supported (destination address is the same as source address).
+* RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_GMAC is supported by library version v0.51 or later.
 
 
 Installation
diff --git a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
index 8deb68b9a..48b183e81 100644
--- a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ New Features
   * Added the handler to get firmware version string.
   * Added support for multicast filtering.
 
+* **Updated the AESNI MB PMD.**
+
+  The AESNI MB PMD has been updated with additional support for the AES-GMAC
+  authentication only algorithm.
+
 
 Removed Items
 -------------
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC
  2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
                           ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 3/3] doc: update release note and pmd info Fan Zhang
@ 2018-12-20 12:07         ` Fan Zhang
  2019-01-09 22:15           ` De Lara Guarch, Pablo
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Fan Zhang @ 2018-12-20 12:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal, pablo.de.lara.guarch

This patchh adds the AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB
PMD, including the driver code, cryptodev unit test, and documentation
updates.

This patch depends on the following patchset
"[PATCH v4 0/3] use architecure independent macros"
(https://mails.dpdk.org/archives/dev/2018-December/121788.html)

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>
---
v6:
- combined the patchset into one patch.

v5:
- changed IMB_VERSION_NUM definition place.

v4:
- rebased on top of latest "use architecure independent macros" patchset.
- patch split.

v3:
- rebased on top of latest code.
- updated release note.

v2:
- updated documentation.

 doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst                 |   2 +
 doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst             |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c         | 126 +++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c  | 127 ++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c     |  25 ++++
 .../crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c  |  25 ++++
 test/test/test_cryptodev.c                         |  15 +++
 test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h       |   9 ++
 8 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
index 12532c63e..98082595d 100644
--- a/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/cryptodevs/aesni_mb.rst
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Hash algorithms:
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_SHA512_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_XCBC_HMAC
 * RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_CMAC
+* RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_GMAC
 
 AEAD algorithms:
 
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ Limitations
 
 * Chained mbufs are not supported.
 * Only in-place is currently supported (destination address is the same as source address).
+* RTE_CRYPTO_HASH_AES_GMAC is supported by library version v0.51 or later.
 
 
 Installation
diff --git a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
index 161974c77..3f513a914 100644
--- a/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
+++ b/doc/guides/rel_notes/release_19_02.rst
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ New Features
 
 * **updated the AESNI-MB PMD.**
   * Added support for intel-ipsec-mb version 0.52.
+  * Added AES-GMAC algorithm support.
 
 
 Removed Items
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
index 2c25b7b32..d34cbc36a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd.c
@@ -173,6 +173,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const MB_MGR *mb_mgr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES128_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES192_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			IMB_AES256_GCM_PRE(mb_mgr, xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -735,8 +783,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -776,7 +832,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -788,7 +845,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -826,11 +884,24 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
+
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
 		break;
@@ -854,19 +925,11 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
 	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -908,13 +971,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
index 83250e32c..56ce54946 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_compat.c
@@ -177,6 +177,54 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const struct aesni_mb_op_fns *mb_ops,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+		if (xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE) {
+			sess->cipher.direction = ENCRYPT;
+			sess->chain_order = CIPHER_HASH;
+		} else
+			sess->cipher.direction = DECRYPT;
+
+		sess->auth.algo = AES_GMAC;
+		/*
+		 * Multi-buffer lib supports 8, 12 and 16 bytes of digest.
+		 * If size requested is different, generate the full digest
+		 * (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
+		 * the requested number of bytes.
+		 */
+		if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 12 &&
+				sess->auth.req_digest_len != 8) {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			sess->auth.gen_digest_len = sess->auth.req_digest_len;
+		}
+		sess->iv.length = xform->auth.iv.length;
+		sess->iv.offset = xform->auth.iv.offset;
+
+		switch (xform->auth.key.length) {
+		case AES_128_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_128_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_128)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_192_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_192_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_192)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		case AES_256_BYTES:
+			sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = AES_256_BYTES;
+			(mb_ops->aux.keyexp.aes_gcm_256)(xform->auth.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.gcm_key);
+			break;
+		default:
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, PMD, "failed to parse test type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	switch (xform->auth.algo) {
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC:
 		sess->auth.algo = MD5;
@@ -760,8 +808,16 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
-		job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->u.GCM.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* For GMAC */
+			job->u.GCM.aad = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+					uint8_t *, op->sym->auth.data.offset);
+			job->u.GCM.aad_len_in_bytes = op->sym->auth.data.length;
+			job->cipher_mode = GCM;
+		}
 		job->aes_enc_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		job->aes_dec_key_expanded = &session->cipher.gcm_key;
 		break;
@@ -801,7 +857,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 				rte_pktmbuf_data_len(op->sym->m_src));
 	} else {
 		m_dst = m_src;
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
 		else
 			m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@@ -813,7 +870,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
 		*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
 	} else {
-		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC)
+		if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+				session->cipher.mode == GCM))
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
 		else
 			job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@@ -851,13 +909,26 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 		break;
 
 	case AES_GMAC:
-		job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
-				op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
-		job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.length;
-		job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes;
+		if (session->cipher.mode == GCM) {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->aead.data.length;
+		} else {
+			job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
+					op->sym->auth.data.offset;
+			job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes = 0;
+			job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes = 0;
+		}
 		job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 				session->iv.offset);
+
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -879,19 +950,10 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
 }
 
 static inline void
-verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
-		struct aesni_mb_session *sess)
+verify_digest(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, void *digest, uint16_t len, uint8_t *status)
 {
-	/* Verify digest if required */
-	if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC) {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->aead.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	} else {
-		if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
-				sess->auth.req_digest_len) != 0)
-			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
-	}
+	if (memcmp(job->auth_tag_output, digest, len) != 0)
+		*status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -933,13 +995,24 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
 		case STS_COMPLETED:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
 
-			if (job->hash_alg != NULL_HASH) {
-				if (sess->auth.operation ==
-						RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
-					verify_digest(job, op, sess);
+			if (job->hash_alg == NULL_HASH)
+				break;
+
+			if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
+				if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
+					(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
+						sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->aead.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
 				else
-					generate_digest(job, op, sess);
-			}
+					verify_digest(job,
+						op->sym->auth.digest.data,
+						sess->auth.req_digest_len,
+						&op->status);
+			} else
+				generate_digest(job, op, sess);
 			break;
 		default:
 			op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
index 5788e37d1..56d409b4b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops.c
@@ -360,6 +360,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
index f3eff2685..1ca6baafa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/aesni_mb/rte_aesni_mb_pmd_ops_compat.c
@@ -416,6 +416,31 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
 			}, }
 		}, }
 	},
+	{	/* AES GMAC (AUTH) */
+		.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
+		{.sym = {
+			.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH,
+			{.auth = {
+				.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
+				.block_size = 16,
+				.key_size = {
+					.min = 16,
+					.max = 32,
+					.increment = 8
+				},
+				.digest_size = {
+					.min = 8,
+					.max = 16,
+					.increment = 4
+				},
+				.iv_size = {
+					.min = 12,
+					.max = 12,
+					.increment = 0
+				}
+			}, }
+		}, }
+	},
 	RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
 };
 
diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
index 84065eb49..f437321ac 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev.c
@@ -9228,6 +9228,7 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 	.setup = testsuite_setup,
 	.teardown = testsuite_teardown,
 	.unit_test_cases = {
+#if IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 51, 0)
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_encryption_test_case_1),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
@@ -9341,6 +9342,20 @@ static struct unit_test_suite cryptodev_aesni_mb_testsuite  = {
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
 			test_AES_GCM_authenticated_decryption_sessionless_test_case_1),
 
+		/** AES GMAC Authentication */
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_1),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_2),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_test_case_3),
+		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown,
+			test_AES_GMAC_authentication_verify_test_case_3),
+#endif /* IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 51, 0) */
 
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_chain_mb_all),
 		TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup, ut_teardown, test_AES_cipheronly_mb_all),
diff --git a/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h b/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h
index a02dfb3c3..8964a3bac 100644
--- a/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h
+++ b/test/test/test_cryptodev_hash_test_vectors.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #ifndef TEST_CRYPTODEV_HASH_TEST_VECTORS_H_
 #define TEST_CRYPTODEV_HASH_TEST_VECTORS_H_
 
+#ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_AESNI_MB
+#include <intel-ipsec-mb.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IMB_VERSION_NUM)
+#define IMB_VERSION(a, b, c) (((a) << 16) + ((b) << 8) + (c))
+#define IMB_VERSION_NUM IMB_VERSION(0, 49, 0)
+#endif
+
 static const uint8_t plaintext_hash[] = {
 	"What a lousy earth! He wondered how many people "
 	"were destitute that same night even in his own "
-- 
2.13.6

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC
  2018-12-20 12:07         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC Fan Zhang
@ 2019-01-09 22:15           ` De Lara Guarch, Pablo
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: De Lara Guarch, Pablo @ 2019-01-09 22:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Zhang, Roy Fan, dev; +Cc: akhil.goyal



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Zhang, Roy Fan
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 12:08 PM
> To: dev@dpdk.org
> Cc: akhil.goyal@nxp.com; De Lara Guarch, Pablo
> <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
> Subject: [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC
> 
> This patchh adds the AES-GMAC authentication only support to AESNI-MB
> PMD, including the driver code, cryptodev unit test, and documentation
> updates.
> 
> This patch depends on the following patchset "[PATCH v4 0/3] use
> architecure independent macros"
> (https://mails.dpdk.org/archives/dev/2018-December/121788.html)
> 
> Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Damian Nowak <damianx.nowak@intel.com>

Applied to dpdk-next-crypto.

Thanks,
Pablo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-01-09 22:15 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-11-15 17:24 [dpdk-dev] [PATCH] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
2018-12-11 14:24 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] " Fan Zhang
2018-12-18 13:51   ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v3] " Fan Zhang
2018-12-18 15:22     ` Akhil Goyal
2018-12-19 21:42     ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 0/3] " Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 1/3] " Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 21:42       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v4 3/3] doc: update release note and PMD information Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 22:04       ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 0/3] crypto/aesni_mb: add gmac support Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 1/3] " Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 2/3] test: add aesni-mb gmac test Fan Zhang
2018-12-19 22:04         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v5 3/3] doc: update release note and pmd info Fan Zhang
2018-12-20 12:07         ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v6] crypto/aesni_mb: support AES-GMAC Fan Zhang
2019-01-09 22:15           ` De Lara Guarch, Pablo

DPDK patches and discussions

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