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From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dev@dpdk.org" <dev@dpdk.org>,
	"mtosatti@redhat.com" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	"thomas@monjalon.net" <thomas@monjalon.net>,
	"bluca@debian.org" <bluca@debian.org>,
	"jerinjacobk@gmail.com" <jerinjacobk@gmail.com>,
	"Richardson, Bruce" <bruce.richardson@intel.com>,
	"cohuck@redhat.com" <cohuck@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 0/7] vfio/pci: SR-IOV support
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2020 09:24:45 -0700
Message-ID: <20200306092445.1bd4611c@x1.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3e8db1d0-8afc-f1e9-e857-aead4717fa11@redhat.com>

On Fri, 6 Mar 2020 11:35:21 +0800
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> wrote:

> On 2020/3/6 上午1:14, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 14:09:07 +0800
> > Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> wrote:
> >  
> >> On 2020/2/25 上午10:33, Tian, Kevin wrote:  
> >>>> From: Alex Williamson
> >>>> Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 2:54 AM
> >>>>
> >>>> Changes since v1 are primarily to patch 3/7 where the commit log is
> >>>> rewritten, along with option parsing and failure logging based on
> >>>> upstream discussions.  The primary user visible difference is that
> >>>> option parsing is now much more strict.  If a vf_token option is
> >>>> provided that cannot be used, we generate an error.  As a result of
> >>>> this, opening a PF with a vf_token option will serve as a mechanism of
> >>>> setting the vf_token.  This seems like a more user friendly API than
> >>>> the alternative of sometimes requiring the option (VFs in use) and
> >>>> sometimes rejecting it, and upholds our desire that the option is
> >>>> always either used or rejected.
> >>>>
> >>>> This also means that the VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl is not the only
> >>>> means of setting the VF token, which might call into question whether
> >>>> we absolutely need this new ioctl.  Currently I'm keeping it because I
> >>>> can imagine use cases, for example if a hypervisor were to support
> >>>> SR-IOV, the PF device might be opened without consideration for a VF
> >>>> token and we'd require the hypservisor to close and re-open the PF in
> >>>> order to set a known VF token, which is impractical.
> >>>>
> >>>> Series overview (same as provided with v1):  
> >>> Thanks for doing this!
> >>>     
> >>>> The synopsis of this series is that we have an ongoing desire to drive
> >>>> PCIe SR-IOV PFs from userspace with VFIO.  There's an immediate need
> >>>> for this with DPDK drivers and potentially interesting future use  
> >>> Can you provide a link to the DPDK discussion?
> >>>     
> >>>> cases in virtualization.  We've been reluctant to add this support
> >>>> previously due to the dependency and trust relationship between the
> >>>> VF device and PF driver.  Minimally the PF driver can induce a denial
> >>>> of service to the VF, but depending on the specific implementation,
> >>>> the PF driver might also be responsible for moving data between VFs
> >>>> or have direct access to the state of the VF, including data or state
> >>>> otherwise private to the VF or VF driver.  
> >>> Just a loud thinking. While the motivation of VF token sounds reasonable
> >>> to me, I'm curious why the same concern is not raised in other usages.
> >>> For example, there is no such design in virtio framework, where the
> >>> virtio device could also be restarted, putting in separate process (vhost-user),
> >>> and even in separate VM (virtio-vhost-user), etc.  
> >>
> >> AFAIK, the restart could only be triggered by either VM or qemu. But
> >> yes, the datapath could be offloaded.
> >>
> >> But I'm not sure introducing another dedicated mechanism is better than
> >> using the exist generic POSIX mechanism to make sure the connection
> >> (AF_UINX) is secure.
> >>
> >>  
> >>>    Of course the para-
> >>> virtualized attribute of virtio implies some degree of trust, but as you
> >>> mentioned many SR-IOV implementations support VF->PF communication
> >>> which also implies some level of trust. It's perfectly fine if VFIO just tries
> >>> to do better than other sub-systems, but knowing how other people
> >>> tackle the similar problem may make the whole picture clearer. 😊
> >>>
> >>> +Jason.  
> >>
> >> I'm not quite sure e.g allowing userspace PF driver with kernel VF
> >> driver would not break the assumption of kernel security model. At least
> >> we should forbid a unprivileged PF driver running in userspace.  
> > It might be useful to have your opinion on this series, because that's
> > exactly what we're trying to do here.  Various environments, DPDK
> > specifically, want a userspace PF driver.  This series takes steps to
> > mitigate the risk of having such a driver, such as requiring this VF
> > token interface to extend the VFIO interface and validate participation
> > around a PF that is not considered trusted by the kernel.  
> 
> 
> I may miss something. But what happens if:
> 
> - PF driver is running by unprivileged user
> - PF is programmed to send translated DMA request
> - Then unprivileged user can mangle the kernel data

ATS is a security risk regardless of SR-IOV, how does this change it?
Thanks,

Alex

> > We also set
> > a driver_override to try to make sure no host kernel driver can
> > automatically bind to a VF of a user owned PF, only vfio-pci, but we
> > don't prevent the admin from creating configurations where the VFs are
> > used by other host kernel drivers.
> >
> > I think the question Kevin is inquiring about is whether virtio devices
> > are susceptible to the type of collaborative, shared key environment
> > we're creating here.  For example, can a VM or qemu have access to
> > reset a virtio device in a way that could affect other devices, ex. FLR
> > on a PF that could interfere with VF operation.  Thanks,  
> 
> 
> Right, but I'm not sure it can be done only via virtio or need support 
> from transport (e.g PCI).
> 
> Thanks
> 
> 
> >
> > Alex
> >  


  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-06 16:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-19 18:53 Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:53 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 1/7] vfio: Include optional device match in vfio_device_ops callbacks Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 2/7] vfio/pci: Implement match ops Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 3/7] vfio/pci: Introduce VF token Alex Williamson
2020-02-25  2:59   ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-05 18:17     ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  8:32       ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-06 15:39         ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-07  1:04           ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09  0:46             ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-09  1:22               ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09  1:33               ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09 15:35                 ` Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 4/7] vfio: Introduce VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl and first user Alex Williamson
2020-02-27 17:34   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-03-05 20:51     ` Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 5/7] vfio/pci: Add sriov_configure support Alex Williamson
2020-02-25  3:08   ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-05 18:22     ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-05 20:08       ` Ajit Khaparde
2020-03-06  7:57       ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-06 22:17         ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-07  1:35           ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09  0:46             ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-09  1:48               ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09 14:56                 ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  9:45       ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-06 15:50         ` Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 6/7] vfio/pci: Remove dev_fmt definition Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 7/7] vfio/pci: Cleanup .probe() exit paths Alex Williamson
2020-02-25  2:33 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 0/7] vfio/pci: SR-IOV support Tian, Kevin
2020-02-25  6:09   ` Jason Wang
2020-03-05 17:14     ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  3:35       ` Jason Wang
2020-03-06 16:24         ` Alex Williamson [this message]
2020-03-09  3:36           ` Jason Wang
2020-03-09 14:45             ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-05 17:33   ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  9:21     ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-05  6:38 ` Vamsi Krishna Attunuru

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