From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from dpdk.org (dpdk.org [92.243.14.124]) by inbox.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25D2FA056A; Fri, 6 Mar 2020 17:24:59 +0100 (CET) Received: from [92.243.14.124] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 874A22BA8; Fri, 6 Mar 2020 17:24:58 +0100 (CET) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com [207.211.31.120]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 007D423D for ; Fri, 6 Mar 2020 17:24:56 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1583511896; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=7YQYjXtX5SKdhVMtcrZUxIhpmnZ5HnjhJ3UoT3fYhZg=; b=iEXBrwMkiHjbK0UjTS7nUVB+vaJ5FZoSJPmSSqDS3GBeCOmF9lRbywmPN21lO83rGhehd2 OfXKVWQ7OLVzBXiNoDweQ7eMPdtZBmoVR8I1VGCwlt/ER6ycGV1BGRe8FwVPcQJ33Az5SY vWZ37/zlX5g806SKMvtb3Bo5uEvEae8= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-373-mnL3Hbc1OhqwozznM0zX_A-1; Fri, 06 Mar 2020 11:24:52 -0500 X-MC-Unique: mnL3Hbc1OhqwozznM0zX_A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D9D1EDBF1; Fri, 6 Mar 2020 16:24:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from x1.home (ovpn-116-28.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.116.28]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDA8660C63; Fri, 6 Mar 2020 16:24:46 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2020 09:24:45 -0700 From: Alex Williamson To: Jason Wang Cc: "Tian, Kevin" , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "dev@dpdk.org" , "mtosatti@redhat.com" , "thomas@monjalon.net" , "bluca@debian.org" , "jerinjacobk@gmail.com" , "Richardson, Bruce" , "cohuck@redhat.com" Message-ID: <20200306092445.1bd4611c@x1.home> In-Reply-To: <3e8db1d0-8afc-f1e9-e857-aead4717fa11@redhat.com> References: <158213716959.17090.8399427017403507114.stgit@gimli.home> <20200305101406.02703e2a@w520.home> <3e8db1d0-8afc-f1e9-e857-aead4717fa11@redhat.com> Organization: Red Hat MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 0/7] vfio/pci: SR-IOV support X-BeenThere: dev@dpdk.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: DPDK patches and discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: dev-bounces@dpdk.org Sender: "dev" On Fri, 6 Mar 2020 11:35:21 +0800 Jason Wang wrote: > On 2020/3/6 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=881:14, Alex Williamson wrote: > > On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 14:09:07 +0800 > > Jason Wang wrote: > > =20 > >> On 2020/2/25 =E4=B8=8A=E5=8D=8810:33, Tian, Kevin wrote: =20 > >>>> From: Alex Williamson > >>>> Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 2:54 AM > >>>> > >>>> Changes since v1 are primarily to patch 3/7 where the commit log is > >>>> rewritten, along with option parsing and failure logging based on > >>>> upstream discussions. The primary user visible difference is that > >>>> option parsing is now much more strict. If a vf_token option is > >>>> provided that cannot be used, we generate an error. As a result of > >>>> this, opening a PF with a vf_token option will serve as a mechanism = of > >>>> setting the vf_token. This seems like a more user friendly API than > >>>> the alternative of sometimes requiring the option (VFs in use) and > >>>> sometimes rejecting it, and upholds our desire that the option is > >>>> always either used or rejected. > >>>> > >>>> This also means that the VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl is not the only > >>>> means of setting the VF token, which might call into question whether > >>>> we absolutely need this new ioctl. Currently I'm keeping it because= I > >>>> can imagine use cases, for example if a hypervisor were to support > >>>> SR-IOV, the PF device might be opened without consideration for a VF > >>>> token and we'd require the hypservisor to close and re-open the PF in > >>>> order to set a known VF token, which is impractical. > >>>> > >>>> Series overview (same as provided with v1): =20 > >>> Thanks for doing this! > >>> =20 > >>>> The synopsis of this series is that we have an ongoing desire to dri= ve > >>>> PCIe SR-IOV PFs from userspace with VFIO. There's an immediate need > >>>> for this with DPDK drivers and potentially interesting future use =20 > >>> Can you provide a link to the DPDK discussion? > >>> =20 > >>>> cases in virtualization. We've been reluctant to add this support > >>>> previously due to the dependency and trust relationship between the > >>>> VF device and PF driver. Minimally the PF driver can induce a denial > >>>> of service to the VF, but depending on the specific implementation, > >>>> the PF driver might also be responsible for moving data between VFs > >>>> or have direct access to the state of the VF, including data or state > >>>> otherwise private to the VF or VF driver. =20 > >>> Just a loud thinking. While the motivation of VF token sounds reasona= ble > >>> to me, I'm curious why the same concern is not raised in other usages. > >>> For example, there is no such design in virtio framework, where the > >>> virtio device could also be restarted, putting in separate process (v= host-user), > >>> and even in separate VM (virtio-vhost-user), etc. =20 > >> > >> AFAIK, the restart could only be triggered by either VM or qemu. But > >> yes, the datapath could be offloaded. > >> > >> But I'm not sure introducing another dedicated mechanism is better than > >> using the exist generic POSIX mechanism to make sure the connection > >> (AF_UINX) is secure. > >> > >> =20 > >>> Of course the para- > >>> virtualized attribute of virtio implies some degree of trust, but as = you > >>> mentioned many SR-IOV implementations support VF->PF communication > >>> which also implies some level of trust. It's perfectly fine if VFIO j= ust tries > >>> to do better than other sub-systems, but knowing how other people > >>> tackle the similar problem may make the whole picture clearer. =F0=9F= =98=8A > >>> > >>> +Jason. =20 > >> > >> I'm not quite sure e.g allowing userspace PF driver with kernel VF > >> driver would not break the assumption of kernel security model. At lea= st > >> we should forbid a unprivileged PF driver running in userspace. =20 > > It might be useful to have your opinion on this series, because that's > > exactly what we're trying to do here. Various environments, DPDK > > specifically, want a userspace PF driver. This series takes steps to > > mitigate the risk of having such a driver, such as requiring this VF > > token interface to extend the VFIO interface and validate participation > > around a PF that is not considered trusted by the kernel. =20 >=20 >=20 > I may miss something. But what happens if: >=20 > - PF driver is running by unprivileged user > - PF is programmed to send translated DMA request > - Then unprivileged user can mangle the kernel data ATS is a security risk regardless of SR-IOV, how does this change it? Thanks, Alex > > We also set > > a driver_override to try to make sure no host kernel driver can > > automatically bind to a VF of a user owned PF, only vfio-pci, but we > > don't prevent the admin from creating configurations where the VFs are > > used by other host kernel drivers. > > > > I think the question Kevin is inquiring about is whether virtio devices > > are susceptible to the type of collaborative, shared key environment > > we're creating here. For example, can a VM or qemu have access to > > reset a virtio device in a way that could affect other devices, ex. FLR > > on a PF that could interfere with VF operation. Thanks, =20 >=20 >=20 > Right, but I'm not sure it can be done only via virtio or need support=20 > from transport (e.g PCI). >=20 > Thanks >=20 >=20 > > > > Alex > > =20