DPDK patches and discussions
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From: Thomas Monjalon <thomas.monjalon@6wind.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>,
	dev@dpdk.org, hjk@hansjkoch.de, gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 2/2] uio: new driver to support PCI MSI-X
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 19:11:35 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2696552.dQRxzH79dc@xps13> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5613BB7D.3060202@scylladb.com>

To sum it up,
We want to remove the need of the out-of-tree module igb_uio.
3 possible implementations were discussed so far:
- new UIO driver
- extend uio_pci_generic
- VFIO without IOMMU

It is preferred to avoid creating yet another module to support.
That's why the uio_pci_generic extension would be nice.
In my understanding, there are currently 2 issues with the patches
from Vlad and Stephen:
- IRQ must be mapped to a fd without using a new ioctl
- MSI-X handling in userspace breaks the memory protection

I'm confident the first issue can be fixed with something like sysfs.
About the "security" concern, mainly expressed by MST, I think the idea
of Avi (below) deserves to be discussed.

2015-10-06 15:15, Avi Kivity:
> On 10/06/2015 10:33 AM, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> > Other than implementation objections, so far the two main arguments
> > against this reduce to:
> >    1. If you allow UIO ioctl then it opens an API hook for all the crap out
> >       of tree UIO drivers to do what they want.
> >    2. If you allow UIO MSI-X then you are expanding the usage of userspace
> >       device access in an insecure manner.
[...]
> btw, (2) doesn't really add any insecurity.  The user could already poke 
> at the msix tables (as well as perform DMA); they just couldn't get a 
> useful interrupt out of them.
> 
> Maybe a module parameter "allow_insecure_dma" can be added to 
> uio_pci_generic.  Without the parameter, bus mastering and msix is 
> disabled, with the parameter it is allowed.  This requires the sysadmin 
> to take a positive step in order to make use of their hardware.

Giving the control of the memory protection level to the distribution or
the administrator looks a good idea.
When allowing insecure DMA, a log will make clear how it is supported
-or not- by the system provider.

>From another thread:
2015-10-01 14:09, Michael S. Tsirkin:
> If Linux keeps enabling hacks, no one will bother doing the right thing.
> Upstream inclusion is the only carrot Linux has to make people do the
> right thing.

The "right thing" should be guided by the users needs at a given time.
The "carrot" for a better solution will be to have a well protected system.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-10-16 17:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-30 22:28 [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 0/2] uio_msi: device driver Stephen Hemminger
2015-09-30 22:28 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 1/2] uio: add support for ioctls Stephen Hemminger
2015-09-30 22:28 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 2/2] uio: new driver to support PCI MSI-X Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-01  8:33   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-01 10:37     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-01 16:06       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-01 14:50     ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-01 15:22       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-01 16:31     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-01 17:26       ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-01 18:25         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-05 21:54     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-05 22:09       ` Vladislav Zolotarov
2015-10-05 22:49         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-06  7:33           ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-06 12:15             ` Avi Kivity
2015-10-06 14:07               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-06 15:41                 ` Avi Kivity
2015-10-16 17:11               ` Thomas Monjalon [this message]
2015-10-16 17:20                 ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-06 13:42             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-06  8:23           ` Vlad Zolotarov
2015-10-06 13:58             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-06 14:49               ` Vlad Zolotarov
2015-10-06 15:00                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-06 16:40                   ` Vlad Zolotarov
2015-10-01 23:40   ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-02  0:01     ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-02  1:21       ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-02  0:04     ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-02  2:33       ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-01  8:36 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH 0/2] uio_msi: device driver Michael S. Tsirkin
2015-10-01 10:59 ` Avi Kivity
2015-10-01 14:57   ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-01 19:48     ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-01 22:00       ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-01 23:03         ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-01 23:39           ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-01 23:43             ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-02  0:04               ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-10-02  1:39                 ` Alexander Duyck
2015-10-04 16:49                   ` Vlad Zolotarov
2015-10-04 19:03                     ` Greg KH
2015-10-04 20:49                       ` Vlad Zolotarov

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