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From: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>
To: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dev@dpdk.org" <dev@dpdk.org>,
	"mtosatti@redhat.com" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	"thomas@monjalon.net" <thomas@monjalon.net>,
	"bluca@debian.org" <bluca@debian.org>,
	"jerinjacobk@gmail.com" <jerinjacobk@gmail.com>,
	"Richardson, Bruce" <bruce.richardson@intel.com>,
	"cohuck@redhat.com" <cohuck@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 3/7] vfio/pci: Introduce VF token
Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2020 01:04:41 +0000
Message-ID: <AADFC41AFE54684AB9EE6CBC0274A5D19D7C2018@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200306083906.13c9a762@x1.home>

> From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 11:39 PM
> 
> On Fri, 6 Mar 2020 08:32:40 +0000
> "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> > > From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > > Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 2:18 AM
> > >
> > > On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 02:59:37 +0000
> > > "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > > From: Alex Williamson
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 2:54 AM
> > > > >
> > > > > If we enable SR-IOV on a vfio-pci owned PF, the resulting VFs are not
> > > > > fully isolated from the PF.  The PF can always cause a denial of service
> > > > > to the VF, even if by simply resetting itself.  The degree to which a PF
> > > > > can access the data passed through a VF or interfere with its
> operation
> > > > > is dependent on a given SR-IOV implementation.  Therefore we want
> to
> > > > > avoid a scenario where an existing vfio-pci based userspace driver
> might
> > > > > assume the PF driver is trusted, for example assigning a PF to one VM
> > > > > and VF to another with some expectation of isolation.  IOMMU
> grouping
> > > > > could be a solution to this, but imposes an unnecessarily strong
> > > > > relationship between PF and VF drivers if they need to operate with
> the
> > > > > same IOMMU context.  Instead we introduce a "VF token", which is
> > > > > essentially just a shared secret between PF and VF drivers,
> implemented
> > > > > as a UUID.
> > > > >
> > > > > The VF token can be set by a vfio-pci based PF driver and must be
> known
> > > > > by the vfio-pci based VF driver in order to gain access to the device.
> > > > > This allows the degree to which this VF token is considered secret to
> be
> > > > > determined by the applications and environment.  For example a VM
> > > might
> > > > > generate a random UUID known only internally to the hypervisor
> while a
> > > > > userspace networking appliance might use a shared, or even well
> know,
> > > > > UUID among the application drivers.
> > > > >
> > > > > To incorporate this VF token, the VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD
> interface
> > > is
> > > > > extended to accept key=value pairs in addition to the device name.
> This
> > > > > allows us to most easily deny user access to the device without risk
> > > > > that existing userspace drivers assume region offsets, IRQs, and other
> > > > > device features, leading to more elaborate error paths.  The format of
> > > > > these options are expected to take the form:
> > > > >
> > > > > "$DEVICE_NAME $OPTION1=$VALUE1 $OPTION2=$VALUE2"
> > > > >
> > > > > Where the device name is always provided first for compatibility and
> > > > > additional options are specified in a space separated list.  The
> > > > > relation between and requirements for the additional options will be
> > > > > vfio bus driver dependent, however unknown or unused option
> within
> > > this
> > > > > schema should return error.  This allow for future use of unknown
> > > > > options as well as a positive indication to the user that an option is
> > > > > used.
> > > > >
> > > > > An example VF token option would take this form:
> > > > >
> > > > > "0000:03:00.0 vf_token=2ab74924-c335-45f4-9b16-8569e5b08258"
> > > > >
> > > > > When accessing a VF where the PF is making use of vfio-pci, the user
> > > > > MUST provide the current vf_token.  When accessing a PF, the user
> MUST
> > > > > provide the current vf_token IF there are active VF users or MAY
> provide
> > > > > a vf_token in order to set the current VF token when no VF users are
> > > > > active.  The former requirement assures VF users that an
> unassociated
> > > > > driver cannot usurp the PF device.  These semantics also imply that a
> > > > > VF token MUST be set by a PF driver before VF drivers can access their
> > > > > device, the default token is random and mechanisms to read the
> token
> > > are
> > > > > not provided in order to protect the VF token of previous users.  Use
> of
> > > > > the vf_token option outside of these cases will return an error, as
> > > > > discussed above.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >  drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c         |  198
> > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > >  drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h |    8 +
> > > > >  2 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> > > > > index 2ec6c31d0ab0..8dd6ef9543ca 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> > > > > @@ -466,6 +466,44 @@ static void vfio_pci_disable(struct
> > > vfio_pci_device
> > > > > *vdev)
> > > > >  		vfio_pci_set_power_state(vdev, PCI_D3hot);
> > > > >  }
> > > > >
> > > > > +static struct pci_driver vfio_pci_driver;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static struct vfio_pci_device *get_pf_vdev(struct vfio_pci_device
> *vdev,
> > > > > +					   struct vfio_device **pf_dev)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	struct pci_dev *physfn = pci_physfn(vdev->pdev);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (!vdev->pdev->is_virtfn)
> > > > > +		return NULL;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	*pf_dev = vfio_device_get_from_dev(&physfn->dev);
> > > > > +	if (!*pf_dev)
> > > > > +		return NULL;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (pci_dev_driver(physfn) != &vfio_pci_driver) {
> > > > > +		vfio_device_put(*pf_dev);
> > > > > +		return NULL;
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	return vfio_device_data(*pf_dev);
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static void vfio_pci_vf_token_user_add(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
> int
> > > val)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	struct vfio_device *pf_dev;
> > > > > +	struct vfio_pci_device *pf_vdev = get_pf_vdev(vdev,
> &pf_dev);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (!pf_vdev)
> > > > > +		return;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	mutex_lock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +	pf_vdev->vf_token->users += val;
> > > > > +	WARN_ON(pf_vdev->vf_token->users < 0);
> > > > > +	mutex_unlock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	vfio_device_put(pf_dev);
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > >  static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
> > > > >  {
> > > > >  	struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
> > > > > @@ -473,6 +511,7 @@ static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
> > > > >  	mutex_lock(&vdev->reflck->lock);
> > > > >
> > > > >  	if (!(--vdev->refcnt)) {
> > > > > +		vfio_pci_vf_token_user_add(vdev, -1);
> > > > >  		vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_release(vdev->pdev);
> > > > >  		vfio_pci_disable(vdev);
> > > > >  	}
> > > > > @@ -498,6 +537,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_open(void *device_data)
> > > > >  			goto error;
> > > > >
> > > > >  		vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_open(vdev->pdev);
> > > > > +		vfio_pci_vf_token_user_add(vdev, 1);
> > > > >  	}
> > > > >  	vdev->refcnt++;
> > > > >  error:
> > > > > @@ -1278,11 +1318,148 @@ static void vfio_pci_request(void
> > > *device_data,
> > > > > unsigned int count)
> > > > >  	mutex_unlock(&vdev->igate);
> > > > >  }
> > > > >
> > > > > +static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
> > > > > +				      bool vf_token, uuid_t *uuid)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	/*
> > > > > +	 * There's always some degree of trust or collaboration
> between SR-
> > > > > IOV
> > > > > +	 * PF and VFs, even if just that the PF hosts the SR-IOV
> capability and
> > > > > +	 * can disrupt VFs with a reset, but often the PF has more
> explicit
> > > > > +	 * access to deny service to the VF or access data passed
> through the
> > > > > +	 * VF.  We therefore require an opt-in via a shared VF token
> (UUID)
> > > > > to
> > > > > +	 * represent this trust.  This both prevents that a VF driver
> might
> > > > > +	 * assume the PF driver is a trusted, in-kernel driver, and also
> that
> > > > > +	 * a PF driver might be replaced with a rogue driver, unknown
> to in-
> > > > > use
> > > > > +	 * VF drivers.
> > > > > +	 *
> > > > > +	 * Therefore when presented with a VF, if the PF is a vfio
> device and
> > > > > +	 * it is bound to the vfio-pci driver, the user needs to provide
> a VF
> > > > > +	 * token to access the device, in the form of appending a
> vf_token to
> > > > > +	 * the device name, for example:
> > > > > +	 *
> > > > > +	 * "0000:04:10.0 vf_token=bd8d9d2b-5a5f-4f5a-a211-
> f591514ba1f3"
> > > > > +	 *
> > > > > +	 * When presented with a PF which has VFs in use, the user
> must also
> > > > > +	 * provide the current VF token to prove collaboration with
> existing
> > > > > +	 * VF users.  If VFs are not in use, the VF token provided for
> the PF
> > > > > +	 * device will act to set the VF token.
> > > > > +	 *
> > > > > +	 * If the VF token is provided but unused, a fault is generated.
> > > >
> > > > fault->error, otherwise it is easy to consider a CPU fault. 😊
> > >
> > > Ok, I can make that change, but I think you might have a unique
> > > background to make a leap that a userspace ioctl can trigger a CPU
> > > fault ;)
> > >
> > > > > +	 */
> > > > > +	if (!vdev->pdev->is_virtfn && !vdev->vf_token && !vf_token)
> > > > > +		return 0; /* No VF token provided or required */
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (vdev->pdev->is_virtfn) {
> > > > > +		struct vfio_device *pf_dev;
> > > > > +		struct vfio_pci_device *pf_vdev = get_pf_vdev(vdev,
> > > > > &pf_dev);
> > > > > +		bool match;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		if (!pf_vdev) {
> > > > > +			if (!vf_token)
> > > > > +				return 0; /* PF is not vfio-pci, no VF
> token */
> > > > > +
> > > > > +			pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > +				"VF token incorrectly provided, PF not
> bound
> > > > > to vfio-pci\n");
> > > > > +			return -EINVAL;
> > > > > +		}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		if (!vf_token) {
> > > > > +			vfio_device_put(pf_dev);
> > > > > +			pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > +				"VF token required to access
> device\n");
> > > > > +			return -EACCES;
> > > > > +		}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		mutex_lock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +		match = uuid_equal(uuid, &pf_vdev->vf_token-
> >uuid);
> > > > > +		mutex_unlock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		vfio_device_put(pf_dev);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		if (!match) {
> > > > > +			pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > +				"Incorrect VF token provided for
> device\n");
> > > > > +			return -EACCES;
> > > > > +		}
> > > > > +	} else if (vdev->vf_token) {
> > > > > +		mutex_lock(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +		if (vdev->vf_token->users) {
> > > > > +			if (!vf_token) {
> > > > > +				mutex_unlock(&vdev->vf_token-
> >lock);
> > > > > +				pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > +					"VF token required to access
> > > > > device\n");
> > > > > +				return -EACCES;
> > > > > +			}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +			if (!uuid_equal(uuid, &vdev->vf_token->uuid))
> {
> > > > > +				mutex_unlock(&vdev->vf_token-
> >lock);
> > > > > +				pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > +					"Incorrect VF token provided
> for
> > > > > device\n");
> > > > > +				return -EACCES;
> > > > > +			}
> > > > > +		} else if (vf_token) {
> > > > > +			uuid_copy(&vdev->vf_token->uuid, uuid);
> > > > > +		}
> > > >
> > > > It implies that we allow PF to be accessed w/o providing a VF token,
> > > > as long as no VF is currently in-use, which further means no VF can
> > > > be further assigned since no one knows the random uuid allocated
> > > > by vfio. Just want to confirm whether it is the desired flavor. If an
> > > > user really wants to use PF-only, possibly he should disable SR-IOV
> > > > instead...
> > >
> > > Yes, this is the behavior I'm intending.  Are you suggesting that we
> > > should require a VF token in order to access a PF that has SR-IOV
> > > already enabled?  This introduces an inconsistency that SR-IOV can be
> >
> > yes. I felt that it's meaningless otherwise if an user has no attempt to
> > manage SR-IOV but still leaving it enabled. In many cases, enabling of
> > SR-IOV may reserve some resource in the hardware, thus simply hurting
> > PF performance.
> 
> But a user needs to be granted access to a device by a privileged
> entity and the privileged entity may also enable SR-IOV, so it seems
> you're assuming the privileged entity is operating independently and
> not in the best interest of enabling the specific user case.

what about throwing out a warning for such situation? so the userspace
knows some collaboration is missing before its access to the device.

> 
> > > enabled via sysfs asynchronous to the GET_DEVICE_FD ioctl, so we'd
> need
> > > to secure the sysfs interface to only allow enabling SR-IOV when the PF
> > > is already opened to cases where the VF token is already set?  Thus
> >
> > yes, the PF is assigned to the userspace driver, thus it's reasonable to
> > have the userspace driver decide whether to enable or disable SR-IOV
> > when the PF is under its control. as I replied to patch [5/7], the sysfs
> > interface alone looks problematic w/o knowing whether the userspace
> > driver is willing to manage VFs (by setting a token)...
> 
> As I replied in patch [5/7] the operations don't need to happen
> independently, configuring SR-IOV in advance of the user driver
> attaching or in collaboration with the user driver can also be enabled
> with this series as is.  Allowing the user driver to directly enable
> SR-IOV and create VFs in the host is something I've avoided here, but
> not precluded for later extensions.  I think that allowing a user to
> perform these operations represents a degree of privilege beyond
> ownership of the PF itself, which is why I'm currently only enabling
> the sysfs sriov_configure interface.  The user driver needs to work in
> collaboration with a privileged entity to enable SR-IOV, or be granted
> access to operate on the sysfs interface directly.

Thanks. this assumption was clearly overlooked in my previous thinking.

> 
> > > SR-IOV could be pre-enabled, but the user must provide a vf_token
> > > option on GET_DEVICE_FD, otherwise SR-IOV could only be enabled after
> > > the user sets a VF token.  But then do we need to invalidate the token
> > > at some point, or else it seems like we have the same scenario when the
> > > next user comes along.  We believe there are PFs that require no
> >
> > I think so, e.g. when SR-IOV is being disabled, or when the fd is closed.
> 
> Can you articulate a specific risk that this would resolve?  If we have
> devices like the one supported by pci-pf-stub, where it's apparently
> sufficient to provide no device access other than to enable SR-IOV on
> the PF, re-implementing that in vfio-pci would require that the
> userspace driver is notified when the SR-IOV configuration is changed
> such that a VF token can be re-inserted.  For what gain?
> 
> > > special VF support other than sriov_configure, so those driver could
> > > theoretically close the PF after setting a VF token.  That makes it
> >
> > theoretically yes, but I'm not sure the real gain of supporting such
> > usage. 😊
> 
> Likewise I don't see the gain of restricting it.
> 
> > btw with your question I realize another potential open. Now an
> > user could also use sysfs to reset the PF, which definitely affects the
> > state of VFs. Do we want a token match with that path? or such
> > intention is assumed to be trusted by VF drivers given that only
> > privileged users can do it?
> 
> I think we're going into the weeds here, a privileged user can use the
> pci-sysfs reset interface to break all sorts of things.  I'm certainly
> not going to propose any sort of VF token interface to restrict it.
> Privileged users can do bad things via sysfs.  Privileged users can
> configure PFs in ways that may not be compatible with any given
> userspace VF driver.  I'm assuming collaboration in the best interest
> of enabling the user driver.  Thanks,
> 
> Alex
> 
> > > difficult to determine the lifetime of a VF token and leads to the
> > > interface proposed here of an initial random token, then the user set
> > > token persisting indefinitely.
> > >
> > > I've tended consider all of these to be mechanisms that a user can
> > > shoot themselves in the foot.  Yes, the user and admin can do things
> > > that will fail to work with this interface, for example my testing
> > > involves QEMU, where we don't expose SR-IOV to the guest yet and the
> > > igb driver for the PF will encounter problems running a device with
> > > SR-IOV enabled that it doesn't know about.  Do we want to try to play
> > > nanny and require specific semantics?  I've opt'd for the more simple
> > > code here.
> > >
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		mutex_unlock(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +	} else if (vf_token) {
> > > > > +		pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > +			"VF token incorrectly provided, not a PF or
> VF\n");
> > > > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	return 0;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +#define VF_TOKEN_ARG "vf_token="
> > > > > +
> > > > >  static int vfio_pci_match(void *device_data, char *buf)
> > > > >  {
> > > > >  	struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
> > > > > +	bool vf_token = false;
> > > > > +	uuid_t uuid;
> > > > > +	int ret;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (strncmp(pci_name(vdev->pdev), buf,
> strlen(pci_name(vdev-
> > > > > >pdev))))
> > > > > +		return 0; /* No match */
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	if (strlen(buf) > strlen(pci_name(vdev->pdev))) {
> > > > > +		buf += strlen(pci_name(vdev->pdev));
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		if (*buf != ' ')
> > > > > +			return 0; /* No match: non-whitespace after
> name */
> > > > > +
> > > > > +		while (*buf) {
> > > > > +			if (*buf == ' ') {
> > > > > +				buf++;
> > > > > +				continue;
> > > > > +			}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +			if (!vf_token && !strncmp(buf,
> VF_TOKEN_ARG,
> > > > > +
> strlen(VF_TOKEN_ARG))) {
> > > > > +				buf += strlen(VF_TOKEN_ARG);
> > > > > +
> > > > > +				if (strlen(buf) < UUID_STRING_LEN)
> > > > > +					return -EINVAL;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +				ret = uuid_parse(buf, &uuid);
> > > > > +				if (ret)
> > > > > +					return ret;
> > > > >
> > > > > -	return !strcmp(pci_name(vdev->pdev), buf);
> > > > > +				vf_token = true;
> > > > > +				buf += UUID_STRING_LEN;
> > > > > +			} else {
> > > > > +				/* Unknown/duplicate option */
> > > > > +				return -EINVAL;
> > > > > +			}
> > > > > +		}
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	ret = vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(vdev, vf_token, &uuid);
> > > > > +	if (ret)
> > > > > +		return ret;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	return 1; /* Match */
> > > > >  }
> > > > >
> > > > >  static const struct vfio_device_ops vfio_pci_ops = {
> > > > > @@ -1354,6 +1531,19 @@ static int vfio_pci_probe(struct pci_dev
> *pdev,
> > > > > const struct pci_device_id *id)
> > > > >  		return ret;
> > > > >  	}
> > > > >
> > > > > +	if (pdev->is_physfn) {
> > > > > +		vdev->vf_token = kzalloc(sizeof(*vdev->vf_token),
> > > > > GFP_KERNEL);
> > > > > +		if (!vdev->vf_token) {
> > > > > +			vfio_pci_reflck_put(vdev->reflck);
> > > > > +			vfio_del_group_dev(&pdev->dev);
> > > > > +			vfio_iommu_group_put(group, &pdev->dev);
> > > > > +			kfree(vdev);
> > > > > +			return -ENOMEM;
> > > > > +		}
> > > > > +		mutex_init(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +		uuid_gen(&vdev->vf_token->uuid);
> > > >
> > > > should we also regenerate a random uuid somewhere when SR-IOV is
> > > > disabled and then re-enabled on a PF? Although vfio disallows
> userspace
> > > > to read uuid, it is always safer to avoid caching a secret from previous
> > > > user.
> > >
> > > What if our user is QEMU emulating SR-IOV to the guest.  Do we want to
> > > force a new VF token is set every time we bounce the VFs?  Why?  As
> > > above, the session lifetime of the VF token might be difficult to
> > > determine and I'm not sure paranoia is a sufficient reason to try to
> > > create boundaries for it.  Thanks,
> > >
> > > Alex
> > >
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > +
> > > > >  	if (vfio_pci_is_vga(pdev)) {
> > > > >  		vga_client_register(pdev, vdev, NULL,
> > > > > vfio_pci_set_vga_decode);
> > > > >  		vga_set_legacy_decoding(pdev,
> > > > > @@ -1387,6 +1577,12 @@ static void vfio_pci_remove(struct pci_dev
> > > *pdev)
> > > > >  	if (!vdev)
> > > > >  		return;
> > > > >
> > > > > +	if (vdev->vf_token) {
> > > > > +		WARN_ON(vdev->vf_token->users);
> > > > > +		mutex_destroy(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > +		kfree(vdev->vf_token);
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > +
> > > > >  	vfio_pci_reflck_put(vdev->reflck);
> > > > >
> > > > >  	vfio_iommu_group_put(pdev->dev.iommu_group, &pdev->dev);
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > index 8a2c7607d513..76c11c915949 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> > > > >  #include <linux/pci.h>
> > > > >  #include <linux/irqbypass.h>
> > > > >  #include <linux/types.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/uuid.h>
> > > > >
> > > > >  #ifndef VFIO_PCI_PRIVATE_H
> > > > >  #define VFIO_PCI_PRIVATE_H
> > > > > @@ -84,6 +85,12 @@ struct vfio_pci_reflck {
> > > > >  	struct mutex		lock;
> > > > >  };
> > > > >
> > > > > +struct vfio_pci_vf_token {
> > > > > +	struct mutex		lock;
> > > > > +	uuid_t			uuid;
> > > > > +	int			users;
> > > > > +};
> > > > > +
> > > > >  struct vfio_pci_device {
> > > > >  	struct pci_dev		*pdev;
> > > > >  	void __iomem		*barmap[PCI_STD_NUM_BARS];
> > > > > @@ -122,6 +129,7 @@ struct vfio_pci_device {
> > > > >  	struct list_head	dummy_resources_list;
> > > > >  	struct mutex		ioeventfds_lock;
> > > > >  	struct list_head	ioeventfds_list;
> > > > > +	struct vfio_pci_vf_token	*vf_token;
> > > > >  };
> > > > >
> > > > >  #define is_intx(vdev) (vdev->irq_type == VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX)
> > > >
> >


  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-09  9:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-19 18:53 [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 0/7] vfio/pci: SR-IOV support Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:53 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 1/7] vfio: Include optional device match in vfio_device_ops callbacks Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 2/7] vfio/pci: Implement match ops Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 3/7] vfio/pci: Introduce VF token Alex Williamson
2020-02-25  2:59   ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-05 18:17     ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  8:32       ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-06 15:39         ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-07  1:04           ` Tian, Kevin [this message]
2020-03-09  0:46             ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-09  1:22               ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09  1:33               ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09 15:35                 ` Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 4/7] vfio: Introduce VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl and first user Alex Williamson
2020-02-27 17:34   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-03-05 20:51     ` Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 5/7] vfio/pci: Add sriov_configure support Alex Williamson
2020-02-25  3:08   ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-05 18:22     ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-05 20:08       ` Ajit Khaparde
2020-03-06  7:57       ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-06 22:17         ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-07  1:35           ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09  0:46             ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-09  1:48               ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-09 14:56                 ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  9:45       ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-06 15:50         ` Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 6/7] vfio/pci: Remove dev_fmt definition Alex Williamson
2020-02-19 18:54 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 7/7] vfio/pci: Cleanup .probe() exit paths Alex Williamson
2020-02-25  2:33 ` [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2 0/7] vfio/pci: SR-IOV support Tian, Kevin
2020-02-25  6:09   ` Jason Wang
2020-03-05 17:14     ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  3:35       ` Jason Wang
2020-03-06 16:24         ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-09  3:36           ` Jason Wang
2020-03-09 14:45             ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-05 17:33   ` Alex Williamson
2020-03-06  9:21     ` Tian, Kevin
2020-03-05  6:38 ` Vamsi Krishna Attunuru

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