From: Jack Bond-Preston <jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
To: Kai Ji <kai.ji@intel.com>, Fan Zhang <fanzhang.oss@gmail.com>,
Akhil Goyal <gakhil@marvell.com>
Cc: dev@dpdk.org, stable@dpdk.org,
Wathsala Vithanage <wathsala.vithanage@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/5] crypto/openssl: fix GCM and CCM thread unsafe ctxs
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 12:47:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240607124756.3968704-2-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240607124756.3968704-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
Commit 67ab783b5d70 ("crypto/openssl: use local copy for session
contexts") introduced a fix for concurrency bugs which could occur when
using one OpenSSL PMD session across multiple cores simultaneously. The
solution was to clone the EVP contexts per-buffer to avoid them being
used concurrently.
However, part of commit 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC
routine with 3.0 EVP API") reverted this fix, only for combined ops
(AES-GCM and AES-CCM).
Fix the concurrency issue by cloning EVP contexts per-buffer. An extra
workaround is required for OpenSSL versions which are >= 3.0.0, and
<= 3.2.0. This is because, prior to OpenSSL 3.2.0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy()
is not implemented for AES-GCM or AES-CCM. When using these OpenSSL
versions, create and initialise the context from scratch, per-buffer.
Throughput performance uplift measurements for AES-GCM-128 encrypt on
Ampere Altra Max platform:
1 worker lcore
| buffer sz (B) | prev (Gbps) | optimised (Gbps) | uplift |
|-----------------+---------------+--------------------+----------|
| 64 | 2.60 | 1.31 | -49.5% |
| 256 | 7.69 | 4.45 | -42.1% |
| 1024 | 15.33 | 11.30 | -26.3% |
| 2048 | 18.74 | 15.37 | -18.0% |
| 4096 | 21.11 | 18.80 | -10.9% |
8 worker lcores
| buffer sz (B) | prev (Gbps) | optimised (Gbps) | uplift |
|-----------------+---------------+--------------------+----------|
| 64 | 19.94 | 2.83 | -85.8% |
| 256 | 58.84 | 11.00 | -81.3% |
| 1024 | 119.71 | 42.46 | -64.5% |
| 2048 | 147.69 | 80.91 | -45.2% |
| 4096 | 167.39 | 121.25 | -27.6% |
Fixes: 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC routine with 3.0 EVP API")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org
Signed-off-by: Jack Bond-Preston <jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Wathsala Vithanage <wathsala.vithanage@arm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
index e8cb09defc..3f7f4d8c37 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ get_aead_algo(enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm sess_algo, size_t keylen,
static int
openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm algo,
- uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key)
+ uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX **ctx)
{
int iv_type = 0;
unsigned int do_ccm;
@@ -378,7 +379,7 @@ openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
}
sess->cipher.mode = OPENSSL_CIPHER_LIB;
- sess->cipher.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (get_aead_algo(algo, sess->cipher.key.length,
&sess->cipher.evp_algo) != 0)
@@ -388,19 +389,19 @@ openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
sess->chain_order = OPENSSL_CHAIN_COMBINED;
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(*ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, iv_type, sess->iv.length,
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, iv_type, sess->iv.length,
NULL) <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (do_ccm)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
tag_len, NULL);
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(*ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -410,7 +411,8 @@ openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
static int
openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm algo,
- uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key)
+ uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX **ctx)
{
int iv_type = 0;
unsigned int do_ccm = 0;
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
}
sess->cipher.mode = OPENSSL_CIPHER_LIB;
- sess->cipher.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (get_aead_algo(algo, sess->cipher.key.length,
&sess->cipher.evp_algo) != 0)
@@ -447,24 +449,54 @@ openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
sess->chain_order = OPENSSL_CHAIN_COMBINED;
- if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
+ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(*ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, iv_type,
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, iv_type,
sess->iv.length, NULL) <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (do_ccm)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
tag_len, NULL);
- if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(*ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
+static int openssl_aesni_ctx_clone(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **dest,
+ struct openssl_session *sess)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x30200000L)
+ *dest = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(sess->ctx);
+ return 0;
+#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x30000000L)
+ /* OpenSSL versions 3.0.0 <= V < 3.2.0 have no dupctx() implementation
+ * for AES-GCM and AES-CCM. In this case, we have to create new empty
+ * contexts and initialise, as we did the original context.
+ */
+ if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC)
+ sess->aead_algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM;
+
+ if (sess->cipher.direction == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT)
+ return openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(sess, sess->aead_algo,
+ sess->auth.digest_length, sess->cipher.key.data,
+ dest);
+ else
+ return openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(sess, sess->aead_algo,
+ sess->auth.digest_length, sess->cipher.key.data,
+ dest);
+#else
+ *dest = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(*dest, sess->cipher.ctx) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
/** Set session cipher parameters */
static int
openssl_set_session_cipher_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess,
@@ -623,12 +655,14 @@ openssl_set_session_auth_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess,
return openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(sess,
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM,
xform->auth.digest_length,
- xform->auth.key.data);
+ xform->auth.key.data,
+ &sess->cipher.ctx);
else
return openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(sess,
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM,
xform->auth.digest_length,
- xform->auth.key.data);
+ xform->auth.key.data,
+ &sess->cipher.ctx);
break;
case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5:
@@ -770,10 +804,12 @@ openssl_set_session_aead_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess,
/* Select cipher direction */
if (xform->aead.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_OP_ENCRYPT)
return openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(sess, xform->aead.algo,
- xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data);
+ xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data,
+ &sess->cipher.ctx);
else
return openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(sess, xform->aead.algo,
- xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data);
+ xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data,
+ &sess->cipher.ctx);
}
/** Parse crypto xform chain and set private session parameters */
@@ -1590,6 +1626,12 @@ process_openssl_combined_op
return;
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ if (openssl_aesni_ctx_clone(&ctx, sess) != 0) {
+ op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+
iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
sess->iv.offset);
if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
@@ -1623,12 +1665,12 @@ process_openssl_combined_op
status = process_openssl_auth_encryption_gcm(
mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
aad, aadlen, iv,
- dst, tag, sess->cipher.ctx);
+ dst, tag, ctx);
else
status = process_openssl_auth_encryption_ccm(
mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
aad, aadlen, iv,
- dst, tag, taglen, sess->cipher.ctx);
+ dst, tag, taglen, ctx);
} else {
if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC ||
@@ -1636,14 +1678,16 @@ process_openssl_combined_op
status = process_openssl_auth_decryption_gcm(
mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
aad, aadlen, iv,
- dst, tag, sess->cipher.ctx);
+ dst, tag, ctx);
else
status = process_openssl_auth_decryption_ccm(
mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
aad, aadlen, iv,
- dst, tag, taglen, sess->cipher.ctx);
+ dst, tag, taglen, ctx);
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
if (status != 0) {
if (status == (-EFAULT) &&
sess->auth.operation ==
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-07 12:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20240603160119.1279476-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
2024-06-03 16:01 ` [PATCH " Jack Bond-Preston
[not found] ` <20240603184348.1310331-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
2024-06-03 18:43 ` [PATCH v2 " Jack Bond-Preston
[not found] ` <20240603185939.1312680-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
2024-06-03 18:59 ` Jack Bond-Preston
[not found] ` <20240606102043.2926695-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
2024-06-06 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 " Jack Bond-Preston
2024-06-06 10:44 ` [EXTERNAL] " Akhil Goyal
[not found] ` <20240607124756.3968704-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
2024-06-07 12:47 ` Jack Bond-Preston [this message]
2024-07-01 12:55 ` [PATCH v4 " Ji, Kai
2024-07-02 15:39 ` [EXTERNAL] " Akhil Goyal
2024-07-03 10:49 ` Jack Bond-Preston
[not found] ` <20240703134552.1439633-1-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
2024-07-03 13:45 ` [PATCH v5 " Jack Bond-Preston
2024-07-03 15:20 ` [EXTERNAL] " Akhil Goyal
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