From: Kevin Traynor <ktraynor@redhat.com>
To: Konstantin Ananyev <konstantin.ananyev@huawei.com>
Cc: "Isaac Boukris" <iboukris@gmail.com>,
"Morten Brørup" <mb@smartsharesystems.com>,
"Stephen Hemminger" <stephen@networkplumber.org>,
"dpdk stable" <stable@dpdk.org>
Subject: patch 'bpf: fix load hangs with six IPv6 addresses' has been queued to stable release 21.11.8
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 17:18:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240823161929.1004778-58-ktraynor@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240823161929.1004778-1-ktraynor@redhat.com>
Hi,
FYI, your patch has been queued to stable release 21.11.8
Note it hasn't been pushed to http://dpdk.org/browse/dpdk-stable yet.
It will be pushed if I get no objections before 08/28/24. So please
shout if anyone has objections.
Also note that after the patch there's a diff of the upstream commit vs the
patch applied to the branch. This will indicate if there was any rebasing
needed to apply to the stable branch. If there were code changes for rebasing
(ie: not only metadata diffs), please double check that the rebase was
correctly done.
Queued patches are on a temporary branch at:
https://github.com/kevintraynor/dpdk-stable
This queued commit can be viewed at:
https://github.com/kevintraynor/dpdk-stable/commit/7598b5b537e6b1b4f5f2409153359b7d04594baf
Thanks.
Kevin
---
From 7598b5b537e6b1b4f5f2409153359b7d04594baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konstantin Ananyev <konstantin.ananyev@huawei.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 19:04:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] bpf: fix load hangs with six IPv6 addresses
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ upstream commit a258eebdfb22f95a8a44d31b0eab639aed0a0c4b ]
As described in https://bugs.dpdk.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1465, converting
from following cBPF filter:
"host 1::1 or host 1::1 or host 1::1 or host 1::1 or
host 1::1 or host 1::1"
takes too long for BPF verifier to complete (up to 25 seconds).
Looking at it, I didn't find any actual functional bug.
In fact, it does what is expected: go through each possible path of
BPF program and evaluate register/stack state for each instruction.
The problem is that, for program with a lot of conditional branches,
number of possible paths starts to grow exponentially and such walk
becomes very excessive.
So to minimize number of evaluations, this patch implements heuristic
similar to what Linux kernel does: state pruning.
If from given instruction for given program state, we explore all possible
paths and for each of them reach bpf_exit() without any complaints and a
valid R0 value, then for that instruction this program state can be
marked as 'safe'.
When we later arrive at the same instruction with a state equivalent to
an earlier instruction 'safe' state, we can prune the search.
For now, only states for JCC targets are saved/examined.
Plus add few extra logging for DEBUG level.
Bugzilla ID: 1465
Fixes: 8021917293d0 ("bpf: add extra validation for input BPF program")
Reported-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ananyev <konstantin.ananyev@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Morten Brørup <mb@smartsharesystems.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
---
lib/bpf/bpf_validate.c | 305 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 255 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/bpf/bpf_validate.c b/lib/bpf/bpf_validate.c
index 81bede3701..dfbef6ca42 100644
--- a/lib/bpf/bpf_validate.c
+++ b/lib/bpf/bpf_validate.c
@@ -32,8 +32,11 @@ struct bpf_reg_val {
struct bpf_eval_state {
+ SLIST_ENTRY(bpf_eval_state) next; /* for @safe list traversal */
struct bpf_reg_val rv[EBPF_REG_NUM];
struct bpf_reg_val sv[MAX_BPF_STACK_SIZE / sizeof(uint64_t)];
};
+SLIST_HEAD(bpf_evst_head, bpf_eval_state);
+
/* possible instruction node colour */
enum {
@@ -55,4 +58,7 @@ enum {
#define MAX_EDGES 2
+/* max number of 'safe' evaluated states to track per node */
+#define NODE_EVST_MAX 32
+
struct inst_node {
uint8_t colour;
@@ -62,5 +68,16 @@ struct inst_node {
uint32_t edge_dest[MAX_EDGES];
uint32_t prev_node;
- struct bpf_eval_state *evst;
+ struct {
+ struct bpf_eval_state *cur; /* save/restore for jcc targets */
+ struct bpf_eval_state *start;
+ struct bpf_evst_head safe; /* safe states for track/prune */
+ uint32_t nb_safe;
+ } evst;
+};
+
+struct evst_pool {
+ uint32_t num;
+ uint32_t cur;
+ struct bpf_eval_state *ent;
};
@@ -76,9 +93,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier {
struct bpf_eval_state *evst;
struct inst_node *evin;
- struct {
- uint32_t num;
- uint32_t cur;
- struct bpf_eval_state *ent;
- } evst_pool;
+ struct evst_pool evst_sr_pool; /* for evst save/restore */
+ struct evst_pool evst_tp_pool; /* for evst track/prune */
};
@@ -1088,5 +1102,5 @@ eval_jcc(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins)
tst = bvf->evst;
- fst = bvf->evin->evst;
+ fst = bvf->evin->evst.cur;
frd = fst->rv + ins->dst_reg;
@@ -1817,6 +1831,6 @@ add_edge(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node, uint32_t nidx)
if (nidx > bvf->prm->nb_ins) {
- RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR, "%s: program boundary violation at pc: %u, "
- "next pc: %u\n",
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR,
+ "%s: program boundary violation at pc: %u, next pc: %u\n",
__func__, get_node_idx(bvf, node), nidx);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2094,20 +2108,21 @@ validate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
*/
static struct bpf_eval_state *
-pull_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+pull_eval_state(struct evst_pool *pool)
{
uint32_t n;
- n = bvf->evst_pool.cur;
- if (n == bvf->evst_pool.num)
+ n = pool->cur;
+ if (n == pool->num)
return NULL;
- bvf->evst_pool.cur = n + 1;
- return bvf->evst_pool.ent + n;
+ pool->cur = n + 1;
+ return pool->ent + n;
}
static void
-push_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+push_eval_state(struct evst_pool *pool)
{
- bvf->evst_pool.cur--;
+ RTE_ASSERT(pool->cur != 0);
+ pool->cur--;
}
@@ -2116,6 +2131,7 @@ evst_pool_fini(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
{
bvf->evst = NULL;
- free(bvf->evst_pool.ent);
- memset(&bvf->evst_pool, 0, sizeof(bvf->evst_pool));
+ free(bvf->evst_sr_pool.ent);
+ memset(&bvf->evst_sr_pool, 0, sizeof(bvf->evst_sr_pool));
+ memset(&bvf->evst_tp_pool, 0, sizeof(bvf->evst_tp_pool));
}
@@ -2123,29 +2139,81 @@ static int
evst_pool_init(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
{
- uint32_t n;
+ uint32_t k, n;
- n = bvf->nb_jcc_nodes + 1;
+ /*
+ * We need nb_jcc_nodes + 1 for save_cur/restore_cur
+ * remaining ones will be used for state tracking/pruning.
+ */
+ k = bvf->nb_jcc_nodes + 1;
+ n = k * 3;
- bvf->evst_pool.ent = calloc(n, sizeof(bvf->evst_pool.ent[0]));
- if (bvf->evst_pool.ent == NULL)
+ bvf->evst_sr_pool.ent = calloc(n, sizeof(bvf->evst_sr_pool.ent[0]));
+ if (bvf->evst_sr_pool.ent == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- bvf->evst_pool.num = n;
- bvf->evst_pool.cur = 0;
+ bvf->evst_sr_pool.num = k;
+ bvf->evst_sr_pool.cur = 0;
- bvf->evst = pull_eval_state(bvf);
+ bvf->evst_tp_pool.ent = bvf->evst_sr_pool.ent + k;
+ bvf->evst_tp_pool.num = n - k;
+ bvf->evst_tp_pool.cur = 0;
+
+ bvf->evst = pull_eval_state(&bvf->evst_sr_pool);
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * try to allocate and initialise new eval state for given node.
+ * later if no errors will be encountered, this state will be accepted as
+ * one of the possible 'safe' states for that node.
+ */
+static void
+save_start_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
+{
+ RTE_ASSERT(node->evst.start == NULL);
+
+ /* limit number of states for one node with some reasonable value */
+ if (node->evst.nb_safe >= NODE_EVST_MAX)
+ return;
+
+ /* try to get new eval_state */
+ node->evst.start = pull_eval_state(&bvf->evst_tp_pool);
+
+ /* make a copy of current state */
+ if (node->evst.start != NULL) {
+ memcpy(node->evst.start, bvf->evst, sizeof(*node->evst.start));
+ SLIST_NEXT(node->evst.start, next) = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * add @start state to the list of @safe states.
+ */
+static void
+save_safe_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
+{
+ if (node->evst.start == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&node->evst.safe, node->evst.start, next);
+ node->evst.nb_safe++;
+
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u,state=%p): nb_safe=%u;\n",
+ __func__, bvf, get_node_idx(bvf, node), node->evst.start,
+ node->evst.nb_safe);
+
+ node->evst.start = NULL;
+}
+
/*
* Save current eval state.
*/
static int
-save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
+save_cur_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
{
struct bpf_eval_state *st;
/* get new eval_state for this node */
- st = pull_eval_state(bvf);
+ st = pull_eval_state(&bvf->evst_sr_pool);
if (st == NULL) {
RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR,
@@ -2159,9 +2227,11 @@ save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
/* swap current state with new one */
- node->evst = bvf->evst;
+ RTE_ASSERT(node->evst.cur == NULL);
+ node->evst.cur = bvf->evst;
bvf->evst = st;
RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u) old/new states: %p/%p;\n",
- __func__, bvf, get_node_idx(bvf, node), node->evst, bvf->evst);
+ __func__, bvf, get_node_idx(bvf, node), node->evst.cur,
+ bvf->evst);
return 0;
@@ -2172,12 +2242,13 @@ save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
*/
static void
-restore_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
+restore_cur_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
{
RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u) old/new states: %p/%p;\n",
- __func__, bvf, get_node_idx(bvf, node), bvf->evst, node->evst);
+ __func__, bvf, get_node_idx(bvf, node), bvf->evst,
+ node->evst.cur);
- bvf->evst = node->evst;
- node->evst = NULL;
- push_eval_state(bvf);
+ bvf->evst = node->evst.cur;
+ node->evst.cur = NULL;
+ push_eval_state(&bvf->evst_sr_pool);
}
@@ -2196,5 +2267,5 @@ log_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
rte_log(loglvl, rte_bpf_logtype,
"r%u={\n"
- "\tv={type=%u, size=%zu},\n"
+ "\tv={type=%u, size=%zu, buf_size=%zu},\n"
"\tmask=0x%" PRIx64 ",\n"
"\tu={min=0x%" PRIx64 ", max=0x%" PRIx64 "},\n"
@@ -2202,5 +2273,5 @@ log_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
"};\n",
ins->dst_reg,
- rv->v.type, rv->v.size,
+ rv->v.type, rv->v.size, rv->v.buf_size,
rv->mask,
rv->u.min, rv->u.max,
@@ -2209,11 +2280,109 @@ log_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
/*
- * Do second pass through CFG and try to evaluate instructions
- * via each possible path.
- * Right now evaluation functionality is quite limited.
- * Still need to add extra checks for:
- * - use/return uninitialized registers.
- * - use uninitialized data from the stack.
- * - memory boundaries violation.
+ * compare two evaluation states.
+ * returns zero if @lv is more conservative (safer) then @rv.
+ * returns non-zero value otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+cmp_reg_val_within(const struct bpf_reg_val *lv, const struct bpf_reg_val *rv)
+{
+ /* expect @v and @mask to be identical */
+ if (memcmp(&lv->v, &rv->v, sizeof(lv->v)) != 0 || lv->mask != rv->mask)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* exact match only for mbuf and stack pointers */
+ if (lv->v.type == RTE_BPF_ARG_PTR_MBUF ||
+ lv->v.type == BPF_ARG_PTR_STACK)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (lv->u.min <= rv->u.min && lv->u.max >= rv->u.max &&
+ lv->s.min <= rv->s.min && lv->s.max >= rv->s.max)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compare two evaluation states.
+ * returns zero if they are identical.
+ * returns positive value if @lv is more conservative (safer) then @rv.
+ * returns negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+cmp_eval_state(const struct bpf_eval_state *lv, const struct bpf_eval_state *rv)
+{
+ int32_t rc;
+ uint32_t i, k;
+
+ /* for stack expect identical values */
+ rc = memcmp(lv->sv, rv->sv, sizeof(lv->sv));
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return -(2 * EBPF_REG_NUM);
+
+ k = 0;
+ /* check register values */
+ for (i = 0; i != RTE_DIM(lv->rv); i++) {
+ rc = memcmp(&lv->rv[i], &rv->rv[i], sizeof(lv->rv[i]));
+ if (rc != 0 && cmp_reg_val_within(&lv->rv[i], &rv->rv[i]) != 0)
+ return -(i + 1);
+ k += (rc != 0);
+ }
+
+ return k;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check did we already evaluated that path and can it be pruned that time.
+ */
+static int
+prune_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct inst_node *node,
+ struct inst_node *next)
+{
+ int32_t rc;
+ struct bpf_eval_state *safe;
+
+ rc = INT32_MIN;
+ SLIST_FOREACH(safe, &next->evst.safe, next) {
+ rc = cmp_eval_state(safe, bvf->evst);
+ if (rc >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = (rc >= 0) ? 0 : -1;
+
+ /*
+ * current state doesn't match any safe states,
+ * so no prunning is possible right now,
+ * track current state for future references.
+ */
+ if (rc != 0)
+ save_start_eval_state(bvf, next);
+
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u,next=%u) returns %d, "
+ "next->evst.start=%p, next->evst.nb_safe=%u\n",
+ __func__, bvf, get_node_idx(bvf, node),
+ get_node_idx(bvf, next), rc,
+ next->evst.start, next->evst.nb_safe);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Do second pass through CFG and try to evaluate instructions
+ * via each possible path. The verifier will try all paths, tracking types of
+ * registers used as input to instructions, and updating resulting type via
+ * register state values. Plus for each register and possible stack value it
+ * tries to estimate possible max/min value.
+ * For conditional jumps, a stack is used to save evaluation state, so one
+ * path is explored while the state for the other path is pushed onto the stack.
+ * Then later, we backtrack to the first pushed instruction and repeat the cycle
+ * until the stack is empty and we're done.
+ * For program with many conditional branches walking through all possible path
+ * could be very excessive. So to minimize number of evaluations we use
+ * heuristic similar to what Linux kernel does - state pruning:
+ * If from given instruction for given program state we explore all possible
+ * paths and for each of them reach _exit() without any complaints and a valid
+ * R0 value, then for that instruction, that program state can be marked as
+ * 'safe'. When we later arrive at the same instruction with a state
+ * equivalent to an earlier instruction's 'safe' state, we can prune the search.
+ * For now, only states for JCC targets are saved/examined.
*/
static int
@@ -2226,4 +2395,11 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
struct inst_node *next, *node;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t nb_eval;
+ uint32_t nb_prune;
+ uint32_t nb_save;
+ uint32_t nb_restore;
+ } stats;
+
/* initial state of frame pointer */
static const struct bpf_reg_val rvfp = {
@@ -2249,4 +2425,6 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
rc = 0;
+ memset(&stats, 0, sizeof(stats));
+
while (node != NULL && rc == 0) {
@@ -2262,9 +2440,12 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
/* for jcc node make a copy of evaluation state */
- if (node->nb_edge > 1)
- rc |= save_eval_state(bvf, node);
+ if (node->nb_edge > 1) {
+ rc |= save_cur_eval_state(bvf, node);
+ stats.nb_save++;
+ }
if (ins_chk[op].eval != NULL && rc == 0) {
err = ins_chk[op].eval(bvf, ins + idx);
+ stats.nb_eval++;
if (err != NULL) {
RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR, "%s: %s at pc: %u\n",
@@ -2280,19 +2461,35 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
/* proceed through CFG */
next = get_next_node(bvf, node);
+
if (next != NULL) {
/* proceed with next child */
if (node->cur_edge == node->nb_edge &&
- node->evst != NULL)
- restore_eval_state(bvf, node);
+ node->evst.cur != NULL) {
+ restore_cur_eval_state(bvf, node);
+ stats.nb_restore++;
+ }
- next->prev_node = get_node_idx(bvf, node);
- node = next;
+ /*
+ * for jcc targets: check did we already evaluated
+ * that path and can it's evaluation be skipped that
+ * time.
+ */
+ if (node->nb_edge > 1 && prune_eval_state(bvf, node,
+ next) == 0) {
+ next = NULL;
+ stats.nb_prune++;
+ } else {
+ next->prev_node = get_node_idx(bvf, node);
+ node = next;
+ }
} else {
/*
* finished with current node and all it's kids,
- * proceed with parent
+ * mark it's @start state as safe for future references,
+ * and proceed with parent.
*/
node->cur_edge = 0;
+ save_safe_eval_state(bvf, node);
node = get_prev_node(bvf, node);
@@ -2303,4 +2500,12 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
}
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(%p) returns %d, stats:\n"
+ "node evaluations=%u;\n"
+ "state pruned=%u;\n"
+ "state saves=%u;\n"
+ "state restores=%u;\n",
+ __func__, bvf, rc,
+ stats.nb_eval, stats.nb_prune, stats.nb_save, stats.nb_restore);
+
return rc;
}
--
2.46.0
---
Diff of the applied patch vs upstream commit (please double-check if non-empty:
---
--- - 2024-08-23 17:18:11.601180936 +0100
+++ 0058-bpf-fix-load-hangs-with-six-IPv6-addresses.patch 2024-08-23 17:18:09.722430112 +0100
@@ -1 +1 @@
-From a258eebdfb22f95a8a44d31b0eab639aed0a0c4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7598b5b537e6b1b4f5f2409153359b7d04594baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
@@ -8,0 +9,2 @@
+[ upstream commit a258eebdfb22f95a8a44d31b0eab639aed0a0c4b ]
+
@@ -38 +39,0 @@
-Cc: stable@dpdk.org
@@ -49 +50 @@
-index 11344fff4d..4f47d6dc7b 100644
+index 81bede3701..dfbef6ca42 100644
@@ -52 +53 @@
-@@ -30,8 +30,11 @@ struct bpf_reg_val {
+@@ -32,8 +32,11 @@ struct bpf_reg_val {
@@ -64 +65 @@
-@@ -53,4 +56,7 @@ enum {
+@@ -55,4 +58,7 @@ enum {
@@ -72 +73 @@
-@@ -60,5 +66,16 @@ struct inst_node {
+@@ -62,5 +68,16 @@ struct inst_node {
@@ -90 +91 @@
-@@ -74,9 +91,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier {
+@@ -76,9 +93,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier {
@@ -102 +103 @@
-@@ -1086,5 +1100,5 @@ eval_jcc(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins)
+@@ -1088,5 +1102,5 @@ eval_jcc(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins)
@@ -109 +110 @@
-@@ -1815,6 +1829,6 @@ add_edge(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node, uint32_t nidx)
+@@ -1817,6 +1831,6 @@ add_edge(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node, uint32_t nidx)
@@ -112,4 +113,4 @@
-- RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(ERR, "%s: program boundary violation at pc: %u, "
-- "next pc: %u",
-+ RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(ERR,
-+ "%s: program boundary violation at pc: %u, next pc: %u",
+- RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR, "%s: program boundary violation at pc: %u, "
+- "next pc: %u\n",
++ RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR,
++ "%s: program boundary violation at pc: %u, next pc: %u\n",
@@ -118 +119 @@
-@@ -2092,20 +2106,21 @@ validate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+@@ -2094,20 +2108,21 @@ validate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -147 +148 @@
-@@ -2114,6 +2129,7 @@ evst_pool_fini(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+@@ -2116,6 +2131,7 @@ evst_pool_fini(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -157 +158 @@
-@@ -2121,29 +2137,81 @@ static int
+@@ -2123,29 +2139,81 @@ static int
@@ -227 +228 @@
-+ RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u,state=%p): nb_safe=%u;",
++ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u,state=%p): nb_safe=%u;\n",
@@ -247,2 +248,2 @@
- RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(ERR,
-@@ -2157,9 +2225,11 @@ save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR,
+@@ -2159,9 +2227,11 @@ save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
@@ -256 +257 @@
- RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u) old/new states: %p/%p;",
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u) old/new states: %p/%p;\n",
@@ -262 +263 @@
-@@ -2170,12 +2240,13 @@ save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
+@@ -2172,12 +2242,13 @@ save_eval_state(struct bpf_verifier *bvf, struct inst_node *node)
@@ -268 +269 @@
- RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u) old/new states: %p/%p;",
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u) old/new states: %p/%p;\n",
@@ -281,2 +282,2 @@
-@@ -2194,5 +2265,5 @@ log_dbg_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
- RTE_LOG(DEBUG, BPF,
+@@ -2196,5 +2267,5 @@ log_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
+ rte_log(loglvl, rte_bpf_logtype,
@@ -288 +289 @@
-@@ -2200,5 +2271,5 @@ log_dbg_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
+@@ -2202,5 +2273,5 @@ log_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
@@ -295 +296 @@
-@@ -2207,11 +2278,109 @@ log_dbg_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
+@@ -2209,11 +2280,109 @@ log_eval_state(const struct bpf_verifier *bvf, const struct ebpf_insn *ins,
@@ -384,2 +385,2 @@
-+ RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u,next=%u) returns %d, "
-+ "next->evst.start=%p, next->evst.nb_safe=%u",
++ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(bvf=%p,node=%u,next=%u) returns %d, "
++ "next->evst.start=%p, next->evst.nb_safe=%u\n",
@@ -412 +413 @@
-@@ -2224,4 +2393,11 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+@@ -2226,4 +2395,11 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -424 +425 @@
-@@ -2247,4 +2423,6 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+@@ -2249,4 +2425,6 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -431 +432 @@
-@@ -2260,9 +2438,12 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+@@ -2262,9 +2440,12 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -445,2 +446,2 @@
- RTE_BPF_LOG_LINE(ERR, "%s: %s at pc: %u",
-@@ -2278,19 +2459,35 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+ RTE_BPF_LOG(ERR, "%s: %s at pc: %u\n",
+@@ -2280,19 +2461,35 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -487 +488 @@
-@@ -2301,4 +2498,12 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
+@@ -2303,4 +2500,12 @@ evaluate(struct bpf_verifier *bvf)
@@ -490 +491 @@
-+ RTE_LOG(DEBUG, BPF, "%s(%p) returns %d, stats:\n"
++ RTE_BPF_LOG(DEBUG, "%s(%p) returns %d, stats:\n"
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-23 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 143+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-23 16:17 patch 'bus/pci: fix build with musl 1.2.4 / Alpine 3.19' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'eal/unix: support ZSTD compression for firmware' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'pcapng: add memcpy check' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/virtio-user: " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'eal/windows: install sched.h file' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'latencystats: fix literal float suffix' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/hns3: fix offload flag of IEEE 1588' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/hns3: fix Rx timestamp flag' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/hns3: fix double free for Rx/Tx queue' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/hns3: fix variable overflow' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/hns3: disable SCTP verification tag for RSS hash input' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/af_packet: align Rx/Tx structs to cache line' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'doc: fix testpmd ring size command' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/af_xdp: fix port ID in Rx mbuf' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/af_xdp: count mbuf allocation failures' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/tap: fix file descriptor check in isolated flow' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: fix MDIO access for non-zero ports and CL45 PHYs' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: reset link when link never comes back' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: fix fluctuations for 1G Bel Fuse SFP' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: update DMA coherency values' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: disable interrupts during device removal' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: fix SFP codes check for DAC cables' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: fix connection for SFP+ active " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: check only minimum speed for " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: fix Tx flow on 30H HW' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: delay AN timeout during KR training' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/axgbe: fix linkup in PHY status' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/ice: fix check for outer UDP checksum offload' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'app/testpmd: fix outer IP " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/i40e: fix outer UDP checksum offload for X710' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'app/testpmd: fix lcore ID restriction' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'hash: fix return code description in Doxygen' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'hash: check name when creating a hash' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'vhost: fix build with GCC 13' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'vhost: cleanup resubmit info before inflight setup' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/virtio: fix MAC table update' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'event/sw: fix warning from useless snprintf' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'eal: fix logs for '--lcores'' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/fm10k: fix cleanup during init failure' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/ixgbe: do not update link status in secondary process' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/ixgbe: do not create delayed interrupt handler twice' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/e1000/base: fix link power down' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/ixgbe/base: revert advertising for X550 2.5G/5G' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/ixgbe/base: fix 5G link speed reported on VF' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/ixgbe/base: fix PHY ID for X550' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/cnxk: fix RSS config' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/cnxk: fix outbound security with higher packet burst' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/cnxk: fix promiscuous state after MAC change' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'hash: fix RCU reclamation size' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'common/mlx5: fix unsigned/signed mismatch' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:17 ` patch 'net/mlx5: fix indexed pool with invalid index' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/mlx5: fix hash Rx queue release in flow sample' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'telemetry: lower log level on socket error' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'app/bbdev: fix interrupt tests' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'dmadev: fix structure alignment' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'vdpa/sfc: remove dead code' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'bpf: fix MOV instruction evaluation' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` Kevin Traynor [this message]
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'telemetry: fix connection parameter parsing' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'baseband/la12xx: forbid secondary process' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'crypto/cnxk: fix minimal input normalization' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'cryptodev: fix build without crypto callbacks' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'cryptodev: validate crypto callbacks from next node' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'crypto/openssl: optimize 3DES-CTR context init' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'crypto/openssl: set cipher padding once' " Kevin Traynor
2024-09-04 14:24 ` Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'common/dpaax/caamflib: fix PDCP-SDAP watchdog error' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'common/dpaax/caamflib: fix PDCP AES-AES " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'crypto/dpaa2_sec: fix event queue user context' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SA salt endianness' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-26 8:07 ` [EXTERNAL] " Akhil Goyal
2024-08-26 11:06 ` Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'fbarray: fix incorrect lookahead behavior' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'fbarray: fix incorrect lookbehind " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'fbarray: fix lookahead ignore mask handling' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'fbarray: fix lookbehind " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'eal/linux: lower log level on allocation attempt failure' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'app/testpmd: fix help string of BPF load command' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'bus/dpaa: fix bus scan for DMA devices' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'bus/dpaa: fix memory leak in bus scan' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'common/dpaax: fix IOVA table cleanup' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'common/dpaax: fix node array overrun' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'bus/dpaa: remove redundant file descriptor check' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'fbarray: fix finding for unaligned length' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'buildtools: fix build with clang 17 and ASan' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix pointer to variable outside scope' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix sign extension' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix size when allocating children arrays' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix GCS descriptor field offsets' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix return type of bitmap hamming weight' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix check for existing switch rule' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix potential TLV length overflow' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix board type definition' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix masking when reading context' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'app/testpmd: handle IEEE1588 init failure' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'app/testpmd: fix parsing for connection tracking item' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix tunnel packet parsing' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix flow filters in VT mode' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix Tx hang on queue disable' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: restrict configuration of VLAN strip offload' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: reconfigure more MAC Rx registers' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix VF promiscuous and allmulticast' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ngbe: keep PHY power down while device probing' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix hotplug remove' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ngbe: " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix MTU range' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ngbe: " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix memory leaks' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ngbe: " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/txgbe: fix Rx interrupt' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/vmxnet3: fix init logs' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ena: fix bad checksum handling' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-26 10:26 ` Brandes, Shai
2024-08-26 11:17 ` Kevin Traynor
2024-09-02 13:01 ` Brandes, Shai
2024-09-04 14:30 ` Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/ena: fix return value check' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:18 ` patch 'net/nfp: fix disabling 32-bit build' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'test/crypto: fix allocation comment' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'doc: fix typo in l2fwd-crypto guide' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'test/crypto: fix asymmetric capability test' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/ice: fix memory leaks in raw pattern parsing' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/ice: fix return value for " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/mlx5: fix Arm build with GCC 9.1' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/mlx5: fix MTU configuration' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/mlx5: fix end condition of reading xstats' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/mlx5: fix uplink port probing in bonding mode' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'common/mlx5: remove unneeded field when modify RQ table' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/hns3: check Rx DMA address alignmnent' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/ark: fix index arithmetic' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'ethdev: fix GENEVE option item conversion' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'app/testpmd: fix build on signed comparison' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'bus/pci: fix UIO resource mapping in secondary process' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'bus/pci: fix FD " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'app/dumpcap: handle SIGTERM and SIGHUP' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'app/pdump: " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'malloc: fix multi-process wait condition handling' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'bus/vdev: fix device reinitialization' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/hns3: fix uninitialized variable in FEC query' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'net/ice/base: fix temporary failures reading NVM' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'doc: remove reference to mbuf pkt field' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'examples/ipsec-secgw: revert SA salt endianness' " Kevin Traynor
2024-08-23 16:19 ` patch 'doc: add baseline mode in l3fwd-power guide' " Kevin Traynor
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